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ABSTRACT
Covering Congress: Media Effects on Evaluations
of the Legislative Branch. (May 2009)
Tyler Charles Johnson, B.A., Northwestern University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Paul M. Kellstedt
This project takes an in-depth look at the role that media coverage of both
individual members of Congress and Congress as a whole plays in shaping approval
of legislators and the legislative branch. I argue that by examining what the media
choose to cover and how the media cover it, we can learn more about the standards
by which judgments of political performance take place. As such, I also contend
that differences between the tone and substance in which the media cover individual
legislators compared to how they cover the legislative branch go a long way to ex-
plaining why Americans cast favor upon those they send to Congress and cast doubt
on Congress itself.
The essential dichotomy examined in the project, based on Thomas Patterson’s
(1993) assessment of the changing nature of how the mass media cover campaigning,
splits reporting on Congress into governing coverage and game coverage. Govern-
ing coverage deals more with substantive issues, policy problems, and signals that
business is taking place. Game coverage, on the other hand, is more concerned with
the parliamentary struggles between actors and parties to pass legislation and ac-
crue power; it treats politicians as strategic actors always competing for advantages.
Game coverage also focuses heavily on winning and losing. I argue that the over time
focus on either game or governing aspects of legislating and representing will drive
assessments of members of Congress and Congress itself. More specifically, I analyze
how game frame coverage is likely to spur negative job approval, while governing
iv
frame coverage drives positive assessments of job performance.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the 111th Congress began its session in early January of 2009,
polling conducted by USA Today revealed a level of approval that seemed quite
familiar to scholars and pundits alike: the job Congress was doing met with the
favor of only approximately 20 percent of the public. It was not even as if Americans
were unsure as to whether they approved of their Congress or not, as the same polls
revealed that upwards of 70 percent disapproved of the job Congress was doing. This
survey data looked eerily similar to survey data as the 110th Congress adjourned;
for most of the second half of 2008, Congress struggled to find the support of one-
fifth of Americans and at times threatened to break record low levels of approval.
The news when it came to approval for other facets of the 111th Congress was
equally grim. Generic congressional Democrats received only 36 percent approval
according to a Research 2000 survey conducted during the new session’s first week,
while generic congressional Republicans fared twelve points worse. Congressional
leaders also found themselves snared in the mire of low ratings, all unable to break
through the forty percent barrier.
Within mere weeks, however, the fortunes of Congress had changed in the
eyes of Americans. One poll conducted by FOX/Opinion Dynamics revealed by late
February that Congress was at thirty-nine percent approval, while several others
(Associated Press, Gallup, Ipsos/McClatchy) revealed anywhere from a ten to fif-
teen point increase from the earliest days of the session. At the same time, polling
conducted by Research 2000 revealed that congressional Democrats had picked up
nearly fifteen points in approval over the eight weeks since the 111th Congress began,
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2while congressional Republicans had seen their fortunes decline by nearly ten points.
Similarly, congressional leaders on the Democratic side of the aisle improved their
approval rating by a few points at most, while leaders in the Republican minority
saw their approval decline.
Obviously, these changes in approval did not take place in a vacuum. In fact,
one might argue that they took place in one of the most tumultuous periods in politi-
cal history over the past several decades. Following an election that saw Republicans
swept out of the presidency for the first time in eight years and the installment of
a unified Democratic government, during the early months of 2009 Americans saw
the inauguration of Barack Obama set against the backdrop of an economic crisis
that some have called the worst since the Great Depression. During this initial two
month period of the 111th Congress, both parties found themselves welcoming new
members, transitioning from Bush-era appointees to Obama-era appointees, and per-
haps most importantly, trying to get a handle on what the best way to respond to
economic chaos was. By mid-February, Congress passed the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, the first major effort on the part of the Obama admin-
istration and Democratic leaders to deal with the fiscal crises at hand. The bill
was passed 22 days after it was first introduced, and it was not passed without its
share of controversy and squabbling between parties. Not a single House Republican
voted for the initial or post-conference committee version, and only three Senate
Republicans supported the legislation with votes.
If we were seeking a simple explanation for why congressional approval changed
between early January and late February, we might claim the following: the public
responded positively to Congress reacting to a problem and producing a tangible
result (i.e. what has become commonly known as the “stimulus package”). We
3might accept this straightforward interpretation, but it leads to another key question:
how did this happen, namely what helped the American public get on board with
congressional activity here when it had been unwilling to do so in prior months?
We can assume that only a small percentage of Americans knew what specifically
was in the bill, and a microscopically small percentage had even taken a look at
the legislation. We can also assume that a similarly small percentage of Americans
religiously followed the action by watching C-SPAN or C-SPAN2 coverage of House
and Senate floor debate and voting. Instead, most Americans were forced to rely
on an outside source for information on what the bill included, how the bill was
proceeding through the House and Senate, and who was for or against the legislation
and the elements within it. That source, for many, was undoubtedly a newspaper, a
magazine, a television program, or a radio broadcast.
The Media and Approval
We know that when a newspaper writes about a piece of legislation or a televi-
sion news program reports about it, they cannot discuss every detail. There are not
enough column inches or hours in the day to go that in-depth. Instead, the media
serves as a filter of sorts, holding onto what they deem key pieces of information
while letting what they deem less essential pieces of information fall by the wayside.
Americans, therefore, get part of the story. Perhaps more importantly for those in
government, the part of the story Americans get is based on media choices and not
on choices made by those actually elected and voting on legislation. Why should we
care about this filtration role the mass media might play in shaping how Americans
approve or disapprove of the legislative branch, its leaders, and its members? I argue
that we should care given the potential power for governing that lies in approval for
both legislators and the legislative branch.
4At its base, the meaning behind approval might be similar to those argued in
other opinion literatures (most prominently, the political trust literature as captured
by Hetherington (2005)). Approval shows whether or not an entity like Congress is
meeting the goals laid out by the public, or if it is failing to do so. Approval might also
help Congress achieve goals when it is forced to interact with outsiders (Luhmann
1979). The presidency literature argues that presidential approval is a “source of
influence” (Edwards and Wayne 2003, p.349) in negotiations with Congress. The
potential for influence based on approval, however, is not necessarily a one way street.
Just as the President can claim that he has the support of the general public, so too
can congressional leaders wield the weapon of approval in their negotiations with
the executive. Other reasons why we want to examine approval are that approval
might send a signal as to broader feelings about American willingness to continue
to buy into the democratic system and form of leadership chosen over two hundred
years ago and still employed today (Warren 1999). For individual legislators, the
importance of approval is clearer: it updates them on how well they are meeting the
needs of constituents and it portends electoral successes or failures down the line.
This project will show though that approval may be a variable that is, to some
extent, out of the hands of those (members of Congress, leaders within Congress, the
institution itself) who truly need it. Instead, approval of legislators and the legislative
branch is partially guided by how the media cover these political actors. More
specifically, this project will show how specific media choices (more commonly called
frames) drive the ebb and flow of congressional approval, separate popular legislators
from unpopular ones and shape changes in month to month sentiments, and influence
what individuals feel about Congress and those they send to Washington to represent
them.
5Outline
In Chapter II, I discuss the central front in the debate over approval of leg-
islators and the legislative branch: the paradox that Congress consistently suffers
from low approval while individuals members of Congress are generally liked and are
often rewarded with surprisingly high levels of approval and, every two or six years,
re-election. I lay out a description of the ongoing debate surrounding what shapes
approval. I then proceed to discuss existing attempts to explain such opinions and
assess why these attempts are not as broad or complete as they should be. I fol-
low by laying out an argument that opinions of Congress and its members might be
explained, to a great extent, by the media coverage these two groups receive; more
specifically, I will claim that media framing, above and beyond the actual outputs
of the House, the Senate, and their 535 members, goes a long way toward deter-
mining why Congress is consistently hamstrung by low opinion and why members of
Congress receive positive reviews from the general public. I focus on the prevalence
of two frames discussed by the campaign literature (specifically, Patterson (1993)):
game and governing. I will close with a brief discussion of the path I plan on taking
in determining what media coverage should be examined, why, and how in building
and substantiating a link between what reporters report and how citizens respond.
Chapter III tackles one half of the paradox laid out by Fenno (1975): the
approval of Congress. It begins by laying out already existing explanations for con-
gressional approval. These explanations include the work of Congress itself, the work
of outsiders, and events that shape the political landscape. I also show how scholars
disagree strongly as to what truly determines the public opinion fate of the legislative
branch. I then explain why the game and governing framing discussed in Chapter II
are credible predictors of when and why Congress will be approved and disapproved.
6After offering two testable hypotheses, I explain how approval of Congress is best
measured given data limitations over time. I also explain how game and governing
will be captured in the context of content analysis concerning Congress. After a
detailed description of how I operationalize alternative predictors of approval and
how to best model approval, I show that both game and governing drive approval
in the ways predicted by both Chapter II and the hypotheses offered: game framing
significantly drives approval downward, while governing framing has an upward ef-
fect. In essence, I show that the media, on top of several other factors, matters when
it comes to determining the fate of the legislative branch in the eyes of Americans.
In Chapter IV, I analyze the other half of the approval equation: the approval
of individual legislators. This chapter attempts to answer the question of why we
love our members of Congress (and, in some cases, loathe them) through a look
at media framing of what members of Congress do at home and in Washington.
It examines how the decisions the media make in covering individual members of
Congress (specifically for our purposes here members of the United States Senate)
drive the success or failure of said members in terms of public opinion expressed
through job approval polling. As in the previous chapters, this relationship between
media and opinion will be studies through the lenses of game and governing framing.
I argue that, in similar fashion to opinions of Congress as a whole, the fates of
members of the Senate will be driven to some extent by the ability to be associated
with issues and with accomplishments and disassociated with discussions of conflict
and compromise.
While Chapter III and Chapter IV examine approval in a macro sense, Chapter
V takes on the importance of game and governing framing at the individual level. It
is our goal in this chapter to lay out previous reasons given by other scholars that
7underpin individual-level sentiments toward legislators and the legislative branch.
Often times, these predictors fall into one of two camps: predictors focused on de-
mographics or predictors focused on information on and exposure to government.
Following this discussion, I introduce the concepts of game and governing to the
discussion of approval at the micro level. After offering some specific hypotheses, I
describe the execution of an original survey experiment presenting individuals with
newspaper stories skewed toward game and governing events in Congress and about
legislators. I then search for links between exposure to said stories and assessments
of Congress and its members. The models presented show that being presented
with game and governing material have the potential to shape opinion at the indi-
vidual level; the results are not consistent throughout the exploration of opinions
of Congress, senators, and representatives, but they do show the power of media
framing exists at this level.
Finally, this project concludes with Chapter VI, allowing us to discuss the
totality of the research project. In this chapter, I address key findings and the
success or failure of the attempt to tie framing to evaluations. I also revisit some
of the broader themes discussed in the introduction. I close with a preview of how
framing research of this kind might be applied to other political inquiries.
8CHAPTER II
MEDIA EFFECTS AND FENNO’S PARADOX
In her 1967 book The Concept of Representation, Hanna Pitkin advises repre-
sentatives to “not be found persistently at odds with the wishes of the represented.”
Based on evidence drawn from countless surveys of public opinion (and for that
matter, congressional election results going back decades), it appears that represen-
tatives are rarely out of step enough ideologically or politically to bring on the wrath
of their constituency. Most members of Congress have consistently proven them-
selves able to curry the favor of those they represent, parlaying such support into
an increasingly unbreakable level of job security within the House of Representatives
and the Senate. Instead, it is Congress as a whole that often finds itself at odds
with the American public, in terms of both what policies Americans want from their
government and what the people have in mind when they envision how government
should ideally function. As Richard Fenno (1975) first put it over thirty years ago,
Americans love the members of Congress that represent them and see Congress itself
as a “broken branch” in need of fixing. Why they might do so, however, has proven
to be a complex question with no one answer.
For over three decades, scholars have been examining approval of legislators
and the legislative branch. Slowly but surely, we have begun to determine what drives
each phenomenon, but many questions remain unanswered. One such question is how
information might drive such assessments. Every few years, Americans are asked to
make a decision as to whether individuals or parties deserve to stay in power. In
between elections, individuals are asked by survey researchers to determine whether
or not those in power and those they elect are doing a good job. Few Americans study
Congress and their representatives religiously, so the precious little information they
9do pick up on in the meantime should be essential to understanding why Americans
feel the way they do about Congress and its members. This chapter delves into what
types of information might matter and why.
Fenno’s Paradox
While pollsters and pundits alike had been examining the opinions of the public
concerning their government and their elected officials for years, explanations for
why opinions of Congress and its members were the way they were had not truly
crystallized until Richard Fenno attempted to explain varying levels of support for
legislators and the legislative branch as part of a 1972 editorial project entitled “The
Role of Congress: A Study of the Legislative Branch.”1 Following ten members of
the House of Representatives as they traveled around their home districts attempting
to meet constituents, solve local problems, and shore up efforts to get re-elected in
the future, Fenno discovered one core sentiment about representation that existed
no matter where he visited: citizens seemed extremely happy with their member
of Congress. Fenno went so far as to say that those he interviewed, no matter
where they lived, thought they had the “best congressman in the United States”
(p. 277). This claim of an excellent relationship between member of Congress and
district existed amongst younger and older constituents, amongst Democrats and
Republicans, amongst liberals and conservatives, and across districts from one coast
to the other. Somewhat strong levels of satisfaction should be expected according
to Fenno, given that in elections held previous to his research, over 95 percent of
House members and over 80 percent of Senate members running for re-election were
successful (Fenno 1975).
1This presentation was later repackaged, more famously, as the chapter “If, As Ralph Nader Says,
‘Congress Is The Broken Branch,’ How Come We Love Our Congressmen So Much?” in Norman J.
Ornstein’s 1975 edited volume Congress in Change: Evolution and Reform. For clarity’s sake, we
will cite Fenno rather than Ornstein in discussing this work.
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Also lying at the crux of Fenno’s investigation into why polling data about
Congress is the way it is are survey data that show that while opinions of members
of Congress are booming, opinions of the institution are swooning. At the time
Fenno first began investigating members of the House (1970), Congress found itself
at 25 percent approval and 66 percent disapproval, a chasm between satisfaction
and dissatisfaction that should appear familiar to scholars of congressional opinion.
These numbers reflect a gap that is not a relic from nearly forty years ago, but
rather a moment in a trend over time that consistently shows Congress as suffering
and failing in its attempt to curry favor with the general public. As such, these
figures did not seem to surprise Fenno either: as he put it, Americans “do not love
our Congress” (p. 277).
Noting the seeming disconnect between these two ways (institutional-level and
representative-level) in which Americans assess the performance of the legislative
branch, Fenno finds himself asking the following: “if Congressmen are so good, how
can Congress be so bad? If it is the individuals that make up the institution, why
should there be such a disparity in our judgments?” (p. 278). Fenno chalks up this
disparity to what he calls “differing standards of judgment” (p. 278). In essence,
the variables citizens use to assess Congress as a whole are markedly different from
the variables that separate good representatives from poor ones. Additionally, the
variables used to assess Congress are applied in a more demanding fashion that those
used to assess the members of the House and Senate that Americans are asked to
approve or disapprove. A deeper discussion of these standards of judgment reveals
the deficit in drawing favor from which Congress begins and the perpetual difficulty
of any efforts to change the minds of Americans that Congress does and will continue
to face.
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According to Fenno, the fate of Congress depends on the ability of Congress
to deal with and solve problems of national importance. This is, as he puts it, a
“far less tractable task” (p. 278). After all, which problems are the most important
problems? Which problems are national problems? Which problems can be solved,
and which have no solution? Additionally, as Fenno puts it, there is an “inevitable
existence of unsolved problems” (p. 278). The congressional workload is persistent;
there is no point at which the legislative branch can rest on its laurels, confident
that it has answered all the questions Americans are asking. While legislators know
if they have met the standards of those they represent (they are re-elected, and
the margin of this re-election sends a message), there is not necessarily a measure
of congressional success according to Fenno. While the work (be it what they are
working on or how they work on it) of Congress can be very familiar to Americans,
it can be tough for Americans to determine what is a legislative branch victory
and what is a defeat. On top of this, Fenno notes that the standards of judgment
used to assess Congress are not necessarily constant from one time period to the
next. Seven years before Fenno started his journey across congressional districts,
polling data showed a populace interested in cooperation between the legislative and
executive branches; Congress was penalized for being obstructionist. Five years later,
surveys showed that Americans wanted their Congress to serve as a watchdog and
to not cooperate so readily. In essence, the metrics of what the job of Congress is
according to Americans is constantly changing; citizens are unsure as to how they
want Congress to act, especially in relation to other political actors.
On the other hand, individual members of Congress benefit from clearer and
more consistent paths toward meeting the needs of constituents and currying favor.
When assessing members of Congress (and determining, as Fenno (p. 278) puts it,
12
their “representativeness”), citizens focus on two factors: personal style and policy
views. Personal style is the identity members of Congress construct in the eyes of
those in their district. This construction takes place via visits to the district (i.e.
becoming and maintaining a physical presence at home), showing concern for local
projects and the needs of specific individuals, and using the media to spread the
message that this visiting and concern exists and persists. Policy views, on the other
hand, are only a hurdle that members must concern themselves with in that they must
make sure not to be too frequently out of line with district opinion. When it comes
to standards of judgment, members of Congress also benefit from the fact that they,
in some ways, can control the reshaping of standards over time. Congress cannot as
easily control how Americans view their work; individual representatives can make
an effort to educate their constituents as to what is successful representation.
Fenno also argues that there is a deeper dynamic that exists to the question of
standards of judgment; this dynamic captures the relationship members of Congress
have with the institution of which they are a member. This relationship is best char-
acterized as uneasy. Senators and representatives must, first and foremost, worry
about themselves and their ability to hold onto their jobs. While they might have
interest in making sure Congress comes off looking good in the eyes of Americans,
this interest takes a back seat to undertaking tasks that will ensure personal accom-
plishment and success in the eyes of constituents. As such, members of Congress are
focused on building margins of victory that create an electorally impenetrable aura
around themselves. Once this “unbeatability” is constructed, members are allowed
to focus on further increasing their influence in the chamber of which they are a
member. Underpinning both of these imperatives, for many members, is a constant
desire to make and change the policies that government enacts and enforces. Fenno
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argues that these priorities should not necessarily be criticized; after all, the very
picture of representation is one in which representatives either try to mirror or mold
opinions in their district over time to ensure congruency. As such, as citizens we
should want our elected officials to focus on us. What Fenno does question, how-
ever, is the long-term effect on opinions of Congress that representatives create by,
in their efforts to win over constituents, criticizing the very body of which they are
a member. When members of Congress portray themselves as a soldier in a battle
against the institution, they “run for Congress by running against Congress” (p.
280), essentially diminishing government to save themselves.
Another explanation for the standards of judgment Americans adopt that
Fenno chronicles in his examination of opinions is the difficulty of understanding the
functions of Congress versus the ease with which individual members can explain
what they are doing and how they are doing it. Members of Congress approach their
jobs by looking for ways to pursue individual concerns; they look for moments and
opportunities that will, as Fenno puts it, provide maximized opportunities to per-
form, to influence, and to gain credit for accomplishments (an argument reminiscent
of that of Mayhew (1974), who argues for the electoral benefits of being able to at-
tach oneself to positive outcomes). Members of Congress, in essence, are looking for
victories that are simple to explain to those in the home district. When 435 House
members and 100 Senate members are all seeking these easily-explainable opportuni-
ties to reach goals, it leads to an institution that becomes “internally quite complex”
(p. 282). As such, the House and the Senate (and, for that matter, Congress as
a whole) suffer from a lack of organization, a lack of centralization, and a lack of
well-coordinated decision-making according to Fenno; members work to their own
ends and not necessarily to the ends of others or for greater institutional victories.
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There are, of course, things like negotiation, bargaining, and compromise that exist
and keep business moving on a day-to-day and bill-by-bill basis, but the presence of
absence of these variables at large will always be dependent on the personal concerns
of individual members. Congress is left, therefore, as an institutional body subject
to the whims of its members, members whose desire to work on their own (and for
themselves) and not with others (or for a greater congressional good) has led to a
perception that the body is “difficult to grasp from the outside” (p. 282). In essence,
individual members are complex beings, but the additive result of this complexity
across 535 members and 2 chambers leaves us with a legislative branch that is, as
Fenno put it, “difficult to understand” (p. 286).
In summing up his discussion of the different standards of judgment that allow
members of Congress to benefit (in terms of opinion and re-election) from their work
but leave Congress itself in a situation where it is hindered in terms of opinion by
the totality of the work of its members, Fenno offers several prescriptions to move
the public toward a more uniform set of guidelines for evaluating legislators and the
legislative branch. He argues that “the more we come to see institutional performance
as influenced by the desires of the individual member, the more the original puzzle
ought to resolve itself” (p. 286). In order to reach this point, he argues for a
greater understanding of “the close individual-institution relationship—chamber by
chamber, party by party, committee by committee, legislator by legislator” (p. 286).
Fenno also has specific prescriptions for the mass media in covering legislators and the
legislative branch, as well as heuristics the average American can use in assessing their
representation. He calls for the mass media “to forego ‘broken branch’ generalizations
about Congress in favor of examining a committee in-depth, or to forego broad
criticism of the seniority rule for a close look at a committee chairman” (p. 286);
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essentially, Fenno wants the media to cease describing Congress and members of
Congress as separate entities, but to instead talk about the actions of members as
driving the actions of the body, and vice versa. Fenno holds Americans to similar
standards as he holds the media. He wants citizens to “fix the term of our dialogue
with (the individual member) more aggressively,” “force (the individual member) to
think more institutionally” and “hold (the individual member) more accountable for
the performance of the institution” (p. 287).
Attempts to Answer the Paradox
In many ways, Fenno’s piece asks more questions than it answers. Since it
was published, several scholars have made attempts to deliver pieces of this puzzle
of approval. Most of these scholars pick up on the idea that different standards of
evaluation are at the heart of the discrepancy of opinion. Most of these scholars also
focus on the tangible outputs of governing that legislators and the legislative branch
bring forth with each passing term in session.
One of the first articles to attempt to solve the question posed by Fenno was
that of Parker and Davidson (1979). Much like Fenno theorized, Parker and David-
son attempt to explain why American citizens hate Congress but love their member
of Congress through looking at how each body is evaluated differently. Analyzing the
results of two public opinion surveys, Parker and Davidson discover that domestic
policy is the most popular item mentioned by respondents when asked how they eval-
uate Congress as a whole. Moreover, this factor of evaluation has shifted negatively
over time; the authors note that in the first opinion study they include (from 1968),
half of Americans using domestic policy factors positively evaluated Congress, while
by 1977 that positivity was only held by seven percent of respondents using domestic
issues. In addition, Parker and Davidson claim that what they call the “style and
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pace of the legislative process” plays a role in how many judge the performance of
the legislative branch. This style and pace can better be described as the process of
making laws, and according to the authors, those who mentioned this process did so
in a decidedly negative fashion. These two factors in total, claim Parker and David-
son, create in atmosphere in which Congress is a target for blame on a seemingly
innumerable amount of issues, policies, and political problems.
Meanwhile, according to Parker and Davidson, members of Congress are held
to a much lower standard. Evaluations are often based on constituency service
performed by and the personal attributes of the members in question. Since it
is difficult to get into trouble resulting from one’s deliverance of projects to the
district, one’s performance when it comes to ensuring case work is handled, and
one’s own personal attributes, performance measures for members of Congress are
noticeably more positive. Policy actions, according to authors, are rarely listed as
factors leading to evaluations of individual members of Congress. When they are
mentioned, they are often mentioned negatively; the rarity with which they are cited
might be, as Parker and Davidson claim, a blessing in disguise for members, who
should and often do feel a freedom when it comes to policy as a result. As Parker
and Parker (1993) note, the actions of representatives cannot be easily followed by
individual constituents except at a high cost, which is more likely that not not worth
paying on most issues. As long as members are not egregiously and noticeably out of
step on certain votes, it appears they can get away with a certain amount of personal
freedom when it comes to dealing with domestic issues.
In the wake of Parker and Davidson, several others have attempted to take on
the question Fenno posed, but most tend only to look at one part of the problem. In
essence, many choose to answer either the “why do we trust/approve of our member
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of Congress” question or the “why do we disapprove/distrust our Congress” question,
but not both.
Many of the arguments as to why Americans tend to dislike their legislature
as a whole are arguments that have to deal with the processes of politics itself.
Moving beyond earlier pieces that showed approval was largely out of the hands of
Congress, authors like Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) and Durr, Gilmour, and
Wohlbrecht (1997) show that potentially controllable institutional factors play a key
role. Through their look at survey data, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) show that
the national dislike of Congress is not so much about the policies Congress passes,
but instead consists of an idea that the political process is tainted. According to
the authors, many of the characteristics that define the Congress (large size, overly
ponderous, slow to act, open and prone to being argumentative or disputative, inef-
ficient, inequitable) are characteristics that Americans hate. Americans also, despite
being fans of democracy, are believed by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse to be passionately
against some cornerstones of the democratic process, such as compromise, bargaining,
the work of committees, bureaucracy, party activity, and debate. This hatred is af-
firmed in the statistical models of Durr, Gilmour, and Wohlbrecht (1997), who show
that variables dealing with veto overrides and intra-Congress conflict significantly
predict dissatisfaction. Moreover though, according to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse,
dislike of Congress is not limited to dislike of the institution itself, but also includes
dislike of what one might call the “typical member of Congress.” Americans might
like the people they send to Washington, but they tend to dislike the people others
send to Washington.
Given these institutional factors that hamstring the ability of Congress as a
whole to find favor, what might allow Congress to gain esteem? Showing a sense
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of efficiency and equity would provide one path (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995).
Americans also want opportunities to get involved in the political world, and they
want to be heard and taken seriously. These are not easy tasks for the Congress to
accomplish, especially when it has no institutional support for such actions (especially
when such actions might come at the detriment of individuals fighting to keep their
jobs). Additionally, at times approval and support are completely out of the hands
of Congress; according to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, the “nature of the times” and
support for other institutions can have some effect on how individuals view and assess
their representation. Evaluations of Congress might also be hindered by the fact
that Americans know little about the dominant players in Congress, how Congress
operates, and how legislation is proceeding (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Mondak
et al. 2007). Knowledgeable individuals assess Congress based on its own merits,
but less knowledgeable individuals tend to rely on other informational cues (such as
knowledge of the President) to make their decisions about other government actors
(Mondak et. al 2007); as such, for some, evaluations of Congress might be evaluations
of everything but Congress.
On the other hand, approval of individual members of Congress, it is argued, is
based on the relationships that individual citizens are able to build with said mem-
bers. Other than the potential positive effect that trusting the system as a whole
might have on trusting members of Congress (Parker and Parker 1993), many claim
that trust and approval of the members individuals send to Congress is based on
personal and impersonal contact of one sort or another. Parker and Parker (1993),
drawing upon Fenno’s (1978) look at “home style,” note that constituents often take
what one could call an “ignorance is bliss” type of attitude toward their members
of Congress. Approval is based, therefore, on the types of factors that lead individ-
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uals to vote for a member of Congress in the first place (for example, as Mayhew
(1974) argues, the ability to deliver projects to the home district, the ability to get
information about the job that is being done across to constituents, and the ability
to take positions on the key issues of the day) and until individuals hear news to
the contrary they will continue to assume those they sent to Washington are doing
a good job.
A question then presents itself: if we take as a given that Congress does produce
outputs (and we should, seeing as we know legislators are writing bills and resolutions,
holding committee hearings, giving floor speeches, and casting votes on the bills and
resolutions that survive the process), we must wonder how most Americans would
go about picking up on these outputs. Additionally, as Fiorina et al. (2009, p.124)
state, “very few Americans experience national politics firsthand.” Only a small
percentage of Americans spend their lives immersed in the legislative process. Short
of watching C-Span on a regular basis or constantly logging online to Thomas, the
Library of Congress website that catalogues federal legislative activity and history,
an individual would have an extremely difficult time keeping abreast of the unending
flow of business taking place in the House and Senate.
Luckily, Americans do not necessarily need this full information in order to
make decisions about the world around them (or, more specifically for our effort here,
legislators and the legislative branch). Americans form what Lupia and McCubbins
(1998, p.35) call “attention strategies,” whereby they figure out how to pay attention,
where to pay attention, and what information will allow them to make reasoned
choices about politics. They may not pay attention to all information, but they are
able to absorb some information (Graber 1988). Resources exist to deliver pieces of
information. The premier resource available to the general public to teach lessons
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about what is taking place in their government is the mass media. The media serve as
a conduit of information that helps bridge the gap between the activity of politicians
and the average American seeking to make sense of what has happened, what is
happening, and what will happen.
Why and How the Media Matter
We know that the media lie at the center of the information dispersion and
reception process for most Americans. Americans read newspapers and magazines,
watch television, listen to the radio, and visit websites. Sometimes, this media usage
is explicitly political. We know, however, that the political product that individuals
encounter when utilizing these forms of media is not the entirety of political activity
that has taken place that day. There is a distinct difference though between simply
providing the totality of information to a public and providing a selection of infor-
mation to the public, which is what the media do. As Patterson (1993, p.29) claims,
“news is a highly refracted version of reality.” The media need time and space to
tell complex stories, but space and time are two luxuries the media generally can-
not afford to waste (Graber 1988). There is a limited amount of airtime or column
space that can be devoted to politics. Media sources must, therefore, as Lippmann
(1922) argues, serve as a flashlight and not a mirror, highlighting some aspects and
disregarding others. If the media are only telling part of the story, the part they
are telling has the potential to drive what individuals remember, what individuals
believe, and how individuals react when pressed to discuss their views. What the
media discuss, therefore, needs to be examined under a more powerful microscope. It
is, after all, the pool of information from which Americans draw in forming attitudes
about their government and those who run it.
We know that the media tell some stories and ignore others. they attempt to
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determine what is newsworthy and what is not (Clawson and Oxley 2008). They
search for the types of stories that sell copies or attract viewers, and then push those
stories until every potential detail has been presented and dissected. Throughout this
process, the media are looking for tools by which they can structure the information
they are presenting; they want the stories they are telling to fit a larger narrative, a
narrative that gives reporters a story to tell and that, in a way, makes the decision
of what to report and what to ignore that much easier.
The results of this media picking and choosing information has been shown to
guide individuals along their personal paths of political decision making. As Cohen
(1963) claims (and Iyengar and Kinder (1987) reassert), the media may not tell
individuals what to think, but it surely tells people what to think about. The media
discuss some problems and ignore others, assisting in the task of setting agendas and
priorities for many Americans; this power is, according to Iyengar and Kinder (1987)
not momentary or permanent, but it exists nonetheless. The power of media sources
to shape opinion does not end with agenda setting and prioritization, however; it
continues on to helping shape what is important, relevant, or memorable about
an issue or problem (Berinsky and Kinder 2006, Clawson and Oxley 2008). This
type of media effect is called framing. As defined by Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley
(1997, p.567), framing is “the process by which a communication source...defines and
constructs a political issue or public controversy.” Framing helps set standards by
which Americans think about issues. When framing shapes opinion, we say that a
framing effect exists (Clawson and Oxley 2008). As shown by authors such as Iyengar
(1990), Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997), Nelson and Oxley (1999), Druckman
(2001a), Kellstedt (2003), and Berinsky and Kinder (2006), there is great power in
the possibility of framing effects, especially when it comes to the content of attitudes.
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Put more clearly, the choices the media make when it comes to reporting on an issue
drive the decisions individuals make on the same subject.
So, knowing that the media have the power to utilize frames, are doing so, and
also that the media want to simplify their task of reporting as much as possible in
order to structure their output, the question then presents itself: what potential me-
dia frames should we be looking at when attempting to gauge how the media shapes
opinions of legislators? Examining an idea previously studied in the campaigning
literature might offer a great deal of insight.
Game Versus Governing
It is important to have a feel for what we might expect out of media coverage
of Congress. According to Arnold (2004), we should not expect the media to focus
tightly on the nuances of legislation. We should not expect detailed discussion of
committee work or floor debate. We should not expect scorecards of who voted
how. In essence, we should not expect what one might call a “play by play” look
at the process of making laws. Instead, Arnold suggests that the media, in covering
Congress, might rely on broad storytelling. In addition, the media might utilize
narratives that are well known by the general public and are easily understandable.
If we are searching for potential known narratives that the general public might easily
understand and process, examining the campaign literature might be a good start.
Specifically, I argue that Patterson’s (1993) work on the media and campaigning
offers insight into how media members tackle major political questions.
According to Patterson (and his 1993 look at coverage of political campaigns
Out of Order), the media view politics as a strategic game. They see candidates
not as mouthpieces for various issues or ideas, but instead as constant competitors
for advantages (or failures doomed to disadvantage). Similar to the ideas voiced by
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Bartels (1988), Patterson argues that the concept of the horse race lies at the core
of campaign reporting. As such, every single move that every single politician makes
has a purpose behind it. Decisions are made to move ahead, to gain a foothold or to
seize control of the competition. Patterson is not alone in this conceptualizing of the
campaign as a struggle to get ahead (and to leave others behind); Weaver (1972) sees
candidates as using governmental institutions, public problems, and policy debates
only as pawns that can be moved in this larger game of political chess.
This game framing on the part of the media fits strongly with basic conventions
of the news-gathering process. The game frame always ensures that reporters have a
story to tell; when candidate A speaks about issue X, the story does not necessarily
have to be about why issue X is important so much as it has to be about how talking
about issue X will improve or damage the candidate’s chances to connect with voters.
Reporters, if focused on the candidates and their jockeying for position, are always
ensured a new story because when there are multiple actors taking part in multiple
activities, the situation is guaranteed to shift from one day to the next. Issues do not
always change and they lack the novelty that the battlefield of campaigns always has.
The rise of the game frame is borne out by Patterson, who shows a steady increase
in game coverage of campaigns from 1960 to 1992. This is especially important given
that, in earlier work on this topic, Patterson (1976) shows that voters are able to
recall stories that utilize elements of the game.
Game framing translates neatly into a congressional context. Congress is an
entity in which 535 individuals are constantly competing for advantages and disad-
vantages. At times, these advantages and disadvantages are related to individual
survival, the ability to get re-elected. At times, these advantages and disadvantages
are related to partisan survival, the ability to help assist one’s party into power.
24
The game frame is not the sole frame of campaign coverage though. There is
another frame in play, a frame Patterson calls the governing frame. The governing
frame is centered around the idea that voters see politics as the method by which
leaders are chosen, but perhaps more importantly as a forum through which problems
are solved. Policies, leadership, and debating important issues are what matters to
the public in the campaign setting. Patterson argues that the governing frame is
all about, as V.O. Key (1966) once put it, “central and relevant questions of public
policy.” Governing is, therefore, the discussion of issues and the discussion of the
ability to get things done. While governing framing may not be as prevalent in the
campaign context as is game framing (Patterson 1993), it might be a more powerful
shaper of how individuals feel about those running for office; voters are, as Patterson
(1976) shows in his earlier work on media effects in campaigns, fifty percent more
likely to react strongly to a governing story.
Governing framing translates neatly into a congressional context as well. While
Congress is full of individuals and parties competing against each other, at its core
this competition is also a competition over philosophies of governing and beliefs that
some policy prescriptions are better than others. Issues are what the legislative
process is all about; there is no “game” in Congress without the discussion of issues
and the gears of the legislative process at times turning. While it is true that,
at times, it appears that the struggle between parties and individuals overshadows
the discussion of issues and the functioning of the legislative branch, the governing
material that serves as the foundation on which the potential for governing framing
is built persists.
Game and governing frames have direct applications from the sphere in which
they originated, campaign coverage, to the political sphere that follows campaigning,
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legislating. However, this does not necessarily mean that they might have an impact
on opinion. Why might we expect them to not only be frames that exist, but also
frames that have effects on attitudes? Just because frames exist does not mean they
necessarily have power over opinions (Druckman 2001b, Druckman 2003). I argue
that the link between game, governing, and opinion lies in the concept of “stealth
democracy” first posited by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002).
Conventional wisdom, according to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, is that Ameri-
cans want to be empowered at the expense of elites. Their research shows, however,
that what Americans truly want is to not make decisions. Americans do not want
to provide input. They do not want to know how the decision-making process is
working. Instead, they want what the authors call a “stealth democracy.” They
want democracy to, as Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002, p.2) put it, “exist but not
to be visible.” They want to know that options exist to hold elites accountable
(i.e. elections), but they do not want to take advantage of them unless absolutely
necessary.
When it comes to policy, Americans obviously want government to deal with
the problems they see as paramount. They also want “the distance between their
own policy preferences and the policies passed by government to be small” (Hibbing
and Theiss Morse 2002, p. 16-17). This is what the authors call policy space. It
is, however, not enough to completely characterize why Americans might feel the
way they do about their government. Data in their work shows that a vast majority
of Americans have preferences that line up with their perceptions of government
positions, but still people report that they think government isn’t working or is out
of touch with most Americans. Where this disconnect rests is in the fact that, as
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002, p. 36) claim, “Americans are attuned to the way
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government works.” This reality signals that in addition to policy space (recognition
of what government can get done), individuals also have process space (recognition
of how government can get things done or what it takes to get things done).
When it comes to this process space, a gap exists between what people want
from the process of governing and how they perceive the process of governing to
be taking place. They want outputs and they want these outputs delivered in a
stealthy fashion (i.e. the gears of government should keep turning, but that turning
should be as conflict free as possible). Instead, they see government as being overly
ponderous and too focused on debate. At times, they feel government is prone to
being argumentative, bound up in endless disputes. They see government as slow to
act. They believe government is an entity that is pervaded by negativity (Hibbing and
Theiss Morse 1995, 2002). These feelings have the potential to subsume any positive
attitudes that might be derived from the policy accomplishments government is able
to produce. In fact, Hibbing and Theiss Morse seem to argue that no matter what
policy makers do, they can’t seem to overcome the problems individuals have with
the ways in which those policy makers operate.
Once again though, we must keep in mind that this policy and process doesn’t
exist in a vacuum. It is transmitted to the public via the newspapers, magazines,
and websites we read, the television programs we watch, and the radio programs we
listen to. The successes and failures associated with policy space are made manifest
in media coverage via the governing frame Patterson discusses. The successes and
failures related to process space is funneled to the public through use of game framing.
Feelings about these spaces and the willingness of media members to report on the
goings-on in each of these spaces has the potential to help in reinforcing or rejecting
commonly held beliefs about government (or, specifically in the case of this inquiry,
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legislators and the legislative branch). In essence, if Americans dislike hearing about
the political process and they receive a large dose of process talk from the mass
media, it is easy to see why they might dislike or disapprove of those entities the
media associates with the process. Similarly, if the media gives the public a large dose
of policy-related reporting, Americans might begin to see those politicians, parties,
or institutions associated with the discussion of policy in a more favorable light.
At its core, therefore, this project operates under the following general theory:
Theory: Media framing of congressional activity alters public views of the
legislative branch.
More specifically, however, I seek to test the following hypotheses in multiple
contexts:
Hypothesis 1: Association with reporting of game frame activities leads to
lower levels of job approval.
Hypothesis 2: Association with reporting of governing frame activities leads
to higher levels of job approval.
We must keep in mind though that the legislative branch and the 535 legislators
who work in it are separate entities and must be studied as such. These 535 legislators
are individuals, standing up for themselves and not necessarily the institution. There
is little reward in standing up for the legislature; all the reward (re-election, power)
lies in the ability to control not how the branch is perceived, but how oneself is
perceived in terms of policy and process. Representatives and senators work hard
to give the media beneficial material to use (and also avoid material that might
hamstring their efforts to gain rewards). Legislators can control their own fates in
many ways, while the fate of Congress itself in the eyes of the general public is subject
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to what the body can produce, how the body produces outputs, and how and to what
extent the media choose to characterize policy and process. It is, in many ways, an
institution without an ombudsman. Discussing how the fates of legislators and the
legislative branch are intertwined is the subject of the next two chapters.
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CHAPTER III
MEDIA FRAMING AND CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL
Ever since polling data first revealed that approval of Congress was low (and
especially low in comparison to the other branches of government), scholars have
attempted to explain why Congress does not receive the favor of the general public.
Often times these explanations have focused on what Congress is doing; in other
words, they have focused on the tangible, measurable outputs of Congress. Less
examined are the ways in which Americans learn about Congress. Here, I test the
validity of the game and governing approach to how the media frames political activ-
ity on national coverage of Congress. I find clear links between the volume of game
and governing activity and the rise and fall of public sentiment toward the legislative
branch over time, showing the power of the mass media to drive what Americans feel
about Congress.
According to a poll taken in the summer of 2008, nearly 8 in 10 Americans felt
their nation was on the wrong track.2 Unsurprisingly, continuing economic problems
(like the rising price of gasoline and the mortgage and foreclosure crisis) and a war
with no end in sight were found to be two of the three main culprits in the search to
explain why Americans feel as pessimistic as they do. Interestingly though, nearly a
quarter of those surveyed pointed to a broader explanation for their fears concerning
where American is headed in the near and distant future: poor leadership. This
sentiment is borne out in more specific polling data, which shows Supreme Court
approval under fifty percent for the first time in three years, a President hovering
around thirty percent approval, and a Congress (traditionally the lowest rated of the
three branches of government) sitting at nineteen percent approval, just one percent
2More details on this AP-Ipsos poll can be found at http://www.ap-ipsosresults.com/
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above the lowest readings ever taken.3 Clearly, Americans are unhappy with the
job their government is doing, and most of all, they are unhappy with the job their
Congress is doing.
Amidst this atmosphere of disapproval, Congress keeps working. Congress
searches for solutions to the problems that lead to American pessimism; it may not
find solutions, but it continues to search. Media coverage of the activities of Congress
bears out these countervailing forces, the desire to deal with issues versus the ability
to manage ideologies and agendas consistently at odds. These forces present differing
pictures to the general public as to what Congress is doing and how Congress is
succeeding or failing at its constitutionally-inherited tasks. One need only look, in the
aftermath of the aforementioned polling, at a wire story concerning a hotly debated
surveillance bill to see the mixed messages concerning what Congress is doing and
how they are doing it facing the public on a daily basis.4 The Associated Press report
details in specifics what the bill does, listing six specific tenets within the legislation.
The reporting ties the bill to broader questions of security and terrorism, questions
that Americans have been and continue to ask. The reporting also discusses the
history of the legislation and the motivations behind crafting the bill. However, the
story also sends different signals, wherein the bill is called “imperfect,” a precursor to
a “rubber stamp” for the White House on surveillance issues, and worthy of filibuster
or defeat when it heads to the Senate. In short, those reading the article will be left
with mixed feelings as to what Congress has truly accomplished, if anything. These
mixed feelings are not limited to this single issue; in fact, as data presented later in
this chapter will show, the story the media tell concerning the actions of Congress is
3More details on this Gallup poll can be found at http://www.gallup.com/poll/108010/Bush-
Congress-Supreme-Court-Near-Historical-Low-Approval.aspx
4See “House passes new surveillance law,” Pamela Hess, Associated Press, June 21, 2008
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always a mixed bag of successes and failures, of issues and conflicts.
It is no wonder Congress finds itself unable to get its head above water in
terms of approval: with every bill passage reported by the media comes a bevy of
information as to why that bill is bad for the country, ineffective, or both. Congress
receives very few victories that come without defeats in terms of spreading wholly
positive information about itself. With Americans dependent on the mass media for
their information about what is taking place in the House and Senate, rare is the
opportunity in which Americans receive information about Congress that is solely
about work being performed and issues being handled. Instead, information is always
tinged with discussions of who is winning and losing and why. The balance of these
two frames, the balance of congressional work being discussed in terms of game
activity or governing activity (as described in Chapter II), therefore, I argue, will
go a long way toward determining whether or not Americans see a single bill or the
preponderance of work performed as a good thing or a bad thing. The mass media
control this balance.
Existing Explanations
Much of the work examining approval or disapproval of the United States
Congress is work that approaches the question from the individual level, focusing
on a set of explanations that are commonplace in public opinion research (such as
involvement, efficacy, socioeconomic status, economic conditions, and feelings about
other political actors). The few articles that examine approval of Congress through
an over time, macro-level lens have developed a similarly consistent battery of ex-
planations as to why Congress is held in that esteem it is from year to year. This
battery of explanations captures the political fates of extra-congressional actors, na-
tional conditions, events and crises, congressional activity, and, to some extent, the
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focus of the mass media on the legislative branch.
The impact of other institutional actors has been theorized to affect the ap-
proval of Congress. Scholars like Parker (1977), Patterson and Caldeira (1990),
and Durr, Gilmour and Wohlbrecht (1997) have all speculated that the fate of the
President might drive the fate of the Congress. More specifically, as Patterson and
Caldeira put it, the “centrality of the presidency to much of U.S. political life” (p.31)
might lead to a situation in which presidential successes and failures (and Ameri-
can assessments of said successes and failures) might bleed into the views citizens
hold concerning government at large and all its components. Whether or not this
is actually the case, however, seems to differ from one study to the next. Parker
finds no relationship between the two in his 1977 piece, while thirteen years later
Patterson and Caldeira find a positive and significant relationship. Durr, Gilmour,
and Wohlbrecht, in perhaps the most specified congressional approval model of all,
find that presidential approval does not affect congressional approval, but replication
of their work by De Boef and Keele (2008) using a more general model finds similarly
to Patterson and Caldeira: as presidential approval increases, congressional approval
increases, suggesting linked fates across branches of government.
Broader national conditions have also been tested in attempts to broadly model
approval of Congress. Beginning with Parker’s (1977) look at unpopularity, these
national conditions have often been expressed through the inclusion of economic vari-
ables. Arguments for the inclusion of such variables in a model gauging approval are
fairly consistent, claiming that Congress will be rewarded in times when the economy
is strong and that it will be punished when the economy is weak. Capturing what
“strong” or “weak” means differs from model to model, but findings of a relation-
ship between economics and approval are generally borne out. Parker (1977) finds
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a significant link between unemployment and positive assessments of the legislative
branch in which declining employment conditions hurt the Congress. Patterson and
Caldeira (1990) find differently when it comes to unemployment (i.e. they find no
relationship), but find instead that consumer sentiment matters; Durr, Gilmour, and
Wolbrecht (1997) find similarly with their measure that divorces consumer sentiment
from the effects of other economic variables.
It has also been argued that specific moments in time matter greatly. More
specifically, these arguments claim that models of congressional approval must mea-
sure scandals within the Congress and conflicts outside the Congress. The presence of
these variables is reminiscent of Mueller’s (1973) claim that international events and
crises (and the reaction of our government to them) might create a “rally around
the flag” effect (or the opposite) that shapes how we view political actors. Durr,
Gilmour, and Wolbrecht were the first to include dummy variables that captured
specific congressional woes (like Koreagate, ABSCAM, the Speaker Wright scandal,
the Keating Five, and problems at the House Bank and House Post Office). Parker
only measures the presence or absence of a war, but he also measures the amount
of time between rally moments, seeking to capture the evaporation of public rally-
ing. Results for events and crises prove widely inconsistent. Parker finds that wars
in general do not predict popularity, but the distance between rallying events does.
Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht find that only one specific scandal (the House Bank
debacle) affects approval; the effect is in the expected direction however (dropping
approval by over 4.5 points).
Crises are not the only way in which specific moments in time are captured
however. Scholars look at specific moments in governing through another lens: the
partisan makeup of the Congress and the executive branch from one year to the next.
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We might consider these to be more moments in governing than they are moments
that affect the everyday lives of Americans, but they are situations that shape in-
stitutional interactions nonetheless. These situations are expressed, more often than
not, by including dummy variables that capture periods of time in which government
is unified or divided (i.e. where the President and Congress are controlled by the
same party of by different parties). Such variables are generally included to capture
the idea that, perhaps during times of unified government, the process of the leg-
islative branch passing bills that will be signed into law by the President will run
more smoothly since there is a shared vision amongst leaders. Results, however, do
not bear this concept out; Parker, Patterson and Caldeira, and Durr, Gilmour, and
Wolbrecht all include variables that capture unified government, but none of these
measures are significant predictors of changes in opinion. Additionally, attempts to
measure legislative support for the President (by both Parker and Patterson and
Caldeira) fall short of driving approval of Congress. Another way of measuring the
interaction between the President and the Congress, looking at vetoes, has proven
more fruitful for scholars. Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht examine the level of ve-
toes per quarter and find them to be significantly linked to congressional approval;
surprisingly though, according to their numbers, Congress benefits from presidential
vetoes.
A more recent addition to the question of congressional approval has been the
idea that the performance of Congress itself might be influencing how Americans
assess the legislative branch. Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht strive to determine
whether or not the “essential activities of Congress” (p. 197) matter. They theorize
that legislative productivity might spur increases in approval of Congress. They cap-
ture this productivity through two measures: the volume of bills passed per quarter
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and the volume of major bills passed per quarter (as gauged by Mayhew (1991)).
According to their findings, major bills matter, but instead of helping approval of
Congress, they hurt approval; the authors speculate that major legislation often times
confuses the public and leaves them unsure as to the benefits and drawbacks. Just
passing legislation has no effect on approval. Another congressional activity, reacting
to presidential vetoes, is found to be a significant predictor of approval of Congress,
but interestingly, the more the Congress overrides a veto, the more their approval
decreases. Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht also examine items like cloture votes and
debt ceiling votes, but their singular measure combining the two (intra-Congress
conflict) is not a significant predictor of approval at the .05 level.
A final (and less fully formed) explanation scholars have examined in attempt-
ing to model congressional approval is that of the potential effects the mass media
might have on the assessments citizens deliver when it comes to the legislative branch.
Both Patterson and Caldeira and Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht dip their toes in
the waters of explaining how the media might affect approval, but do so in markedly
different ways. Both groups of scholars focus on content, but have different con-
ceptions of what content might be important and why. Patterson and Caldeira are
interested in how personal coverage gets (i.e. how many stories in a given period of
time mention individual members of Congress), how institutional coverage gets (i.e.
how many stories in a given period of time mention Congress or its components), and
how ethical coverage gets (i.e. how many stories in a given period of time mention,
as they put it, “ethical issues, pecadillos, indictments or convictions, and congres-
sional investigations” (p. 34)). This is what we might consider to be the first real
attempt to broadly link newspaper coverage to approval of Congress. Patterson and
Caldeira do find links between the institutional coverage, the ethical coverage, and
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approval; when Congress is being discussed in any way, approval goes down, and
when Congress is being discussed in terms of its ethics, approval goes down. On the
other hand, Durr Gilmour, and Wolbrecht are less concerned about breaking down
coverage into different broad types and more concerned about other factors of how
newspapers convey information: the raw amount of information and the placement
of information within the newspaper itself. These authors create a singular measure
that they call a “coverage score” (p. 189), which captures the product of the posi-
tivity or negativity of an article, the location of an article within the newspaper, and
the length of the story itself. Quarters in which stories score high in this measure are
quarters in which approval of Congress increases, while stories in which this measure
is low are quarters in which approval of Congress decreases.
There are theoretical and empirical motivations for further refining the ways in
which we examine the link between the mass media and various measures of approval
of the legislative branch and its members. As I will now lay out, there is great reason
to believe that looking at the game and governing frames distinctly (will matter in
the context of congressional job approval.
Game, Governing, and Congressional Approval
As Chapter II illustrates, there are reasons to believe that game coverage will
drive approval (in general) downward and that governing coverage will drive approval
upward. This is because game coverage reinforces broadly held existing feelings that
government is burdened by the political process. On the other hand, governing
coverage reinforces different feelings, feelings that represent the hope that government
is responding to the issues Americans want addressed and that government is working
as it should. Why should we believe that these relationships will hold true at the
level of the entire legislative branch? The reasons, I argue, are linked to more specific
37
sentiments Americans have concerning Congress itself.
Americans have many beliefs about Congress beyond simple approval or disap-
proval of the job Congress is doing. Americans have opinions on how Congress deals
with specific policy problems, how confident we should be in both the institution it-
self (and in specific leaders in Congress), how much faith we should put in Congress,
how we should rate Congress in comparison to other institutions, how much power
Congress has, how in touch Congress is with Americans, and how efficacious we
should feel when it comes to interacting with Congress (Dennis 1981; Patterson and
Magleby 1992). Perhaps the most coherent picture of the outcomes of these polls
is painted by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) in their description of Congress as
“public enemy.” Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, through the polling they conduct, draw
several conclusions about how Americans view Congress. Americans see Congress
as large and therefore ponderous to a fault. They see Congress as inefficient and
inequitable. They feel Congress does a poor job of dealing with the issues deemed
most important and most in need of address. They feel that Congress is stymied by a
lack of cooperation, but they also, thanks to compromises, are worried that Congress
is unable to find the right answer to problems (and perhaps instead legislators are
settling for the most politically expedient solution). In short, Congress clearly has
a perception problem, and that problem is multi-faceted in nature and not easily
solved.
Given, as argued in Chapter II, that the mass media are the premier source of
information about Congress for most Americans, what the media say (or do not say)
about the actions of Congress can be expected to go a long way toward reinforcing or
contradicting these widely held views and, as such, molding opinion about approval
at a specific point in time. I posit throughout this work that there are two frames we
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should be looking at in the congressional context: game and governing.5 We should
expect the prevalence of these frames to have wildly different effects on the opinions
of Americans when it comes to reviewing and rating the legislative branch. Game
coverage, in that it is tinged with constant discussion of compromise and conflict,
should serve to reinforce and further fuel the opinions of Congress as slow, inefficient,
and ineffective as displayed in the survey data delivered by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse
(1995). Game language provides a constant reminder to Americans that Congress
is still stuck in the morass, slow to change and slow to accomplish anything. Game
language in the congressional context only tells Americans what they think they
already know about Congress: that it is too caught up in battles for power to battle
for the issues and solutions citizens crave. Game language, to put it in terms used by
Kimball and Patterson (1997), reinforces what citizens think “Congress is actually
like” (p. 701). In that it activates and builds upon existing negative sentiments
about the ways in which Congress does business, we should expect game coverage to
drive approval of what Congress has just done and plans to do in the future. More
specifically, I argue the following:
Hypothesis 1: Increases in coverage of game frame activities leads to decreas-
ing congressional job approval.
If, on the other hand, as Parker and Davidson (1979) and Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse (1995, 2002) suggest, Americans want the legislative branch to address salient
issues and deliver policy outputs directly connected to these salient issues, they are
likely to respond favorably to media discussions capturing the presence of and move-
ment on these issues in Washington (i.e. governing coverage). Governing coverage, in
that it directly addresses salient issues in the context of Congress, inextricably links
5As Chapter II notes, these frames are based on concepts originated by Patterson (1993). He
uses them solely in a campaign context however.
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Congress to a perception that accomplishments are coming forth from the House
and the Senate. In that governing coverage is not just about issues but also about
the words and phrases that suggest the business of legislating is ongoing, media
discussions of said ongoing activity on these salient issues will also go a long way to-
ward reinforcing expectations of what government should be doing (i.e. expectations
about what Congress could be that stem from early socialization) that Kimball and
Patterson (1997) first discussed. Governing language sends a signal about Congress
that runs counter to that of the game frame: it tells readers that Congress, despite
whatever struggles between parties and partisans that exist, is still an institution
that is constantly working and that work is centered on the problems citizens need
addressed. These signals should lead to positive feedback. More specifically, I argue
the following:
Hypothesis 2: Increases in coverage of governing frame activities leads to
increasing congressional job approval.
I will now explain how I plan to go about testing these hypotheses.
Examining Congressional Approval
The dependent variable of interest in this chapter is approval of Congress as
a whole; more specifically, it is approval of the job that Congress is doing. I will
be assessing this variable from the first quarter of 1977 to the last quarter of 2006,
giving me thirty years of approval data. In examining approval, this means that, for
the most part, I am looking at questions that use the following language: “Do you
approve or disapprove of the way Congress is handling its job?” A smaller number of
questions ask this in slightly different fashion, using the wording “Do you approve or
disapprove of the job Congress is doing?” It is important to note that this decision to
use only questions of this nature does remove several other types of questions from
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the equation. For example, I ignore questions that ask about approval of specific
parties within Congress and specific leaders within Congress. I leave these out of my
assessment of approval of the legislative branch because I feel they force individuals
to examine factors that might be wholly unrelated to congressional job approval.6
There are complications, however, with looking at polling data of this nature
over time. Many polling groups and media entities ask questions of the nature
described above, but often times they fail to ask the question regularly. For example,
Gallup, one of the first to ask a question capturing congressional job approval, goes
from asking it once or twice a year throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, to
asking it monthly and sometimes weekly in the early 2000s. Finding a way to utilize
multiple measures of congressional job approval is ideal; it will give us a more nuanced
picture as to the changing state of opinion over time, and it will eliminate any
potential problems that using only one survey outfit might generate. One way to
combine survey data from multiple sources into a single measure is to use Stimson’s
dyadic ratio algorithm, which I choose to use here. According to Stimson (1991),
the best way of dealing with the fact that we do not necessarily have data over time
(i.e. that we have missing values) is to focus on the information we do have. We do
so by, as Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht (1997) put it, using not just a single series
of data over time but rather the “shared movement” (p. 179) of as many similar
series as we can accrue. Stimson’s algorithm, as he puts it, is utilizing a common
metric and averaging only measured values; backward recursion, forward recursion,
and smoothing allow the formula to produce a single series to examine.
As Table 1 shows, I use data from ten survey outfits to create my over time
measure of congressional job approval. The ten data sources range widely in terms
6For a look at the specific questions examined in this study, see the Appendix.
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Table 1: Correlations Between Survey Items and Mood Index, 1977 - 2006
Indicator N Loading
ABC/Washington Post 9 0.94
ANES 4 0.99
CBS 36 0.86
CBS/New York Times 59 0.94
Fox News/Opinion Dynamics 17 0.90
Gallup 46 0.96
Gallup/CNN/Usa Today 28 0.94
NBC/Wall Street Journal 57 0.94
Time/CNN 18 0.90
Washington Post 48 0.92
Percent variance explained: 85.9
of the number of times they asked relevant opinion questions on Congress, ranging
from a low of four times asked to a high of 59 times asked. All ten survey sources
load remarkably well into a single measure, and 85.9 percent of the total variance
of the measure is explained. As stated earlier, the Stimson dyadic ratio algorithm
smooths multiple sources of data into a single useful source. Figure 1 gives us an
initial look at this combined measure of congressional job approval.
Taking a look at Figure 1, we see a great deal of movement over time in opin-
ions about the job Congress is doing. Approval of Congress starts out at just over 40
percent at the beginning of the series (quarter one of 1977) and decreases through-
out the end of the 1970s as the Democratic-controlled Congress finds itself unable
to accomplish many of the goals of the Carter administration. The mid-1980s bring
with it increased approval (even in a period of divided government and even divided
Congress with a Republican-controlled Senate and a Democratic-controlled House),
but the late 1980s and early 1990s see a noticeable dip in approval to then historic
lows. Approval of Congress rose throughout the 1990s as Republicans reclaimed the
majority in both chambers for the first time in decades. This approval, unsurpris-
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Figure 1: Approval of Congress, 1977-2006
ingly, peaks in the period just after the terrorist attacks of September 11th. Since the
highs of late 2001 and early 2002, approval of the job Congress is doing has steadily
decreased over time.
Measuring Framing and Congressional Approval
Before discussing what content will be analyzed, it is essential to discuss how
the content analysis process works and what should be kept in mind as we pursue
a content analysis-based answer to our questions. Content analysis is the process of
studying communications for the prevalence of words, phrases, ideas, themes (and,
in our case, media frames) within a text or group of texts (in our case, newspapers).
Broadly speaking, content analysis is, as Mitchell (1968, p.230) puts it, “technical
procedures for producing data” and not a process of manipulating or analyzing data.
It can help us answer many questions about rhetorical methods (Titscher et al. 2000).
Berelson (1952), in his pioneering tome on the state of content analysis, discusses how
this process is well suited for examining communications because of how objective
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and systematic it can be. We must take precaution to ensure the way in which we
analyze content meets these standards. We want to be certain that the way we go
about gathering data does not raise questions of validity and reliability. The process
taken to deliver validity and reliability on content analysis is generally similar across
attempts. Titscher et al. (2000, p.64), translating earlier work by Mayring (1988),
describes a multi-stage process all content analysts must undertake. Two key stages
we must take care to address in detail are as follows: the source material must be
determined, along with what specific questions we seek to answer with said material.
Determining Source Material
This chapter seeks to link specific frames of media coverage to the measure
of congressional approval just illustrated. To do so, it is important to discuss the
process of collecting media accounts of Congress and removing useful information
from said accounts. Using the Lexis-Nexis electronic media database, I collected
all stories that discussed Congress in any fashion from January 1977 to December
2006.7 Stories were collected from the Washington Post ; this choice (versus using
the New York Times like several other scholars examining media) was made because
the archives of the Post date to 1977, farther back than any other credible national
news source.8
Before looking in detail at the nature of coverage of Congress over time, we
7The specific search terms used in Lexis-Nexis to build my potential pool of stories about
Congress were “Congress,” “Senate,” and “congressman.”
8Some have argued that, given the limited readership of a single newspaper and the decreasing
readership of newspapers over time, anyone examining media should be concerned about using
newspaper coverage as a gauge of media coverage broadly defined. I feel these fears are worthy
of debate but, in the end, are not entirely warranted. As Caldeira (1986) argues, elite media may
reach a small percentage of the public, but it reaches nearly all of the individuals we might consider
to be “opinion leaders.” This coverage also will, as Caldeira puts it, ”filter down into the towns
and villages of America.” In addition, some of the decreased readership of newspapers is being
balanced out by sharp increases in the use of alternative forms of reading the reporting newspapers
undertake, such as the use of newspaper websites.
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must first address a key question about said coverage: what constitutes a story
about Congress? What separates a substantive story that individuals can use to
learn about the workings of the legislative branch from a story that provides mere
fluff? Content analysis of media coverage requires decision rules, and the decision
rules for this examination are as follows:
1) Stories in which Congress as a whole (and, more specifically, stories just
about the House or Senate) in which the legislative branch is taking an active role are
stories about Congress. This includes stories about bills being introduced, debated,
conferenced between House and Senate, and passing or failing. It also includes stories
about congressional hearings. In total, stories like these where the Congress acts
make up the bulk of stories analyzed here. This decision rule removes stories in
which Congress is not the actor, but rather the subject of actions. For the most
part, this means that stories where the President tells Congress he is going to take
some sort of action are not included; it also means that stories in which agencies
report to Congress are not included. In these cases, the actors speaking to Congress
are, more often than not, the engine driving the story.
2) Stories in which multiple members of Congress make news for their activities
are stories about Congress. More often than not, these stories include ones in which
a group (for example, “House Republicans”) introduce legislation or react to other
groups of legislators or other branches of government. This also includes stories
about congressional scandals in which multiple members are involved.
3) Stories that deal with changing leadership within Congress are stories about
Congress. These may be stories about the decision-making process when it comes
to picking who will take on leadership roles; they may also be stories about how
leadership may change based on potential electoral shifts.
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4) Stories that are about a single legislator are not stories about Congress.
This keeps stories about unilateral action on the part of a member of Congress and
detailed stories about a legislator’s electoral activities (in Washington or at home)
out of the database.
5) Stories about party politics that do not explicitly refer to congressional ac-
tivities are not stories about Congress. This separates stories that talk about, for
example, “Democrats” from stories that talk about “House Democrats” or “Con-
gressional Democrats.”
These five decision rules, I argue, allow me to clearly examine what Congress
is doing and how the public might react to such activities. They assist in keeping
out potential contaminants to the analysis that might result from studying coverage
of other branches of the federal government, other government agencies, and other
political actors (interest groups, candidates) at the same time as I study the legisla-
tive branch. These decision rules best allow me to build the most appropriate and
pure pool of stories that will be linked to approval of Congress.
Using these decision rules leaves me with the pool of stories over time as
shown in Figure 2. There are several important things to note about the coverage
of Congress over time. First, we should note that there is a great deal of movement
from quarter to quarter in terms of the number of stories about Congress. Some of
this movement is probably driven by institutional factors like elections and vacations,
while some is undoubtedly driven by congressional activity. This movement is sub-
stantive interesting, but it is not the focus of our analysis and as such is left to future
discussion. We should also note that there has been a downward shift in coverage
over time. For most of the quarters in the late 1970s and early 1980s, coverage of
Congress reached the level of approximately 100 to 150 stories per quarter. By the
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Figure 2: Number of Stories About Congress, 1977-2006
time of the late 1990s and early 2000s, this has dropped to a level between 50 and 100
stories per quarter. It appears overall coverage of Congress is decreasing. Certain
periods of time, however, do overcome this downward movement; the scandals of the
late 1980s and early 1990s and the transition in chamber control of the mid 1990s
were two periods of time in which media focus on congressional activity was high.
It is important to reiterate in our discussion here that there have been several
scholarly works (Patterson and Caldeira 1990; Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997)
that have tangentially linked media coverage to assessments of the legislative branch.
These two studies provide a good start to the discussion of the potential for media
effects, but they do so more as part of a larger exploratory debate about congressional
approval and not necessarily as a discussion of the power of the media and the
multifaceted mature of reporting on Congress. They also execute their analysis in
markedly different ways. The path my content analysis takes differs from these
earlier attempts. First, the level of analysis being examined here is not the story,
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but instead is a raw count of words or phrases that fit certain frames per quarter. As
will be discussed below, this allows us to study the presence or absence of multiple
frames of language within a single story, rather than trying to awkwardly fit each
story as a whole into a potentially clumsy category. Not every story is a game story
or a governing story; in fact, we should expect very few stories to be one dimensional
in the language they use. Instead, we should expect stories to contain a mix of
language from both frames. This language builds up from story to story, from day
to day, from week to week, and from month to month. It is the volumes of this game
and governing language from quarter to quarter over time that matters.
Second, my “database” of stories about Congress attempts to capture only sto-
ries about Congress itself and is not a kitchen sink of every story remotely mentioning
Congress. This decision rule should give us a more pure look at what coverage of
Congress as a whole looks like, plus it keeps us from conflating coverage of Congress
from coverage of its members (seeing as we are attempting to separate the factors
that drive assessment of legislators from assessments of the legislative branch). This
decision rule differs from that of Patterson and Caldeira, who seem to include ev-
erything remotely related to Congress (including stories about individual members
acting on their own); my standards for inclusion and exclusion seem to be closer
to that of Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht, who state that they are including stories
about Congress itself (but unfortunately are not all that explicit about what exactly
that means). Including dummies for scandals (a la Durr, Gilmour and Wolbrecht)
should provide a proxy for the presence of scandals that equals the Patterson and
Caldeira look at levels of scandal coverage. Excluding stories about individual mem-
bers of Congress eliminates the need to look at a volume of personal stories within
media coverage. This leaves us with the institutional volume Patterson and Caldeira
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examine, which is the set of stories most clearly central to the workings of Congress;
this institutional set of stories is where I feel multiple frames might be at work driving
evaluations in different directions.
The strategy used to analyze coverage of Congress in this study differs greatly
from the attempts previously discussed. Rather than place stories as a whole into
one category or another, content analysis via computerized analysis of text allows us
to extract the relevant portions of a story and decide how stories fit multiple frames
and to what extent. This process is undertaken using a computer program called
WordStat.9
Wordstat allows text to be categorized using user-generated dictionaries. Once
the content set for analyzing by the user is compiled, Wordstat allows for the con-
struction of lists (or dictionaries, as the program calls them), that will be the focus
of the analysis. Dictionaries are simply words or phrases that the user wants the
program to search for. The user can create his or her own dictionaries, but if the
user chooses, Wordstat will also suggest appropriate synonyms that might help en-
hance the dictionary compilation process. To alleviate fears that the computerized
content analysis process is producing results that contain invalid or incorrect forms
of the words and phrases included in dictionaries, Wordstat also includes what the
creators call a “proximity operator” process to ensure only appropriate versions of
the words and phrases being searched for are counted.10 Once our dictionaries are
9Wordstat is produced by Provalis Research.
10The most common proximity operator is setting up decision rules to ensure opposite versions
of the words and phrases to be searched for are not included in frequency totals. For example,
consider a study in which we were interested in determining how often the economy is portrayed
as strong in the media. Consider two potential phrases within a series of stories: “the economy
is strong” and ”the economy is not strong.” These two phrases are opposites, but if we merely
search for the word “strong” in stories about the economy, the second phrase would be included.
Proximity operators can be set up to ensure that the second phrase is not included (by telling the
program to ignore negating words like ”no,” ”not,” or ”nor” within a certain number or words of
any items in our dictionary.)
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set, Wordstat scans our source material for the words and phrases inside them and
produces frequency counts.
I argue that going down the computerized content analysis path is a smarter
approach for studying material in this context than simply relying on the specific
human coding strategy employed by others. Why might this strategy offer greater
insight into content about Congress? There are two clear reasons:
1) Not all stories are wholly about game or governing, wholly positive or neg-
ative or neutral (as Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht claim), or wholly institutional,
personal, or scandalous (as Patterson and Caldeira claim).
Media stories in general tend to tell many different tales; this is especially true
when it comes to stories about Congress. A story might start by discussing the
outcome of a vote in Congress, but then transition into a discussion of the history
of the legislation, an interview with the individuals for and against the bill, and a
prediction about the future of the issue within the branch. Trying to put a story
then into one category instead of multiple categories proves difficult.
However, placing a story into, for example, two categories might lead one to
wonder if the story is equal parts one category and equal parts the other. Finding a
way to code a story as being, for example, seventy percent game and thirty percent
governing would be the most accurate way to capture what story a story is telling.
Looking for key words and phrases within a story allows us to approximate this
measure most closely.
For example, consider the following paragraphs from a March 12, 2006 Wash-
ington Post story about the Senate intelligence committee:
The Senate intelligence committee, once a symbol of bipartisan oversight,
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is now so torn by partisan warfare that it can barely function in a time
of sharp national debate over intelligence matters, according to several
analysts, officials and past and current members.
Inter-party animosity has simmered since the 1990s, but it heated up
when Republicans took steps to limit probes into President Bush’s han-
dling of the Iraq war and domestic spying. It reached a full boil Tuesday,
when the committee voted along party lines to reject a proposed inves-
tigation of the administration’s warrantless surveillance of Americans’
international communications. It voted instead to create a White House-
approved subcommittee to oversee the operation, infuriating Democrats
and some civil libertarians.
These two paragraphs send multiple messages to the reader. The use of the
word “partisan” and the phrase “barely function” sends a clear game frame message
that the business of the committee has slowed and that partisanship matters on this
committee. However, the story also conveys a certain amount of information that
fits the governing frame as well, namely that the committee is dealing with issues
salient to the war in Iraq and domestic spying, two hot button issues. The paragraph
also discusses that a vote was taken, suggesting the work of the committee is ongoing
despite the struggles between the parties.
If we attempted to code stories rather than language here, we would clearly run
into trouble. These paragraphs are not wholly game oriented or governing oriented.
We cannot quite say that the story is neutral either; rather, it sends two clear and
distinct types of signals. Looking at the volume of words within a story like this
allows for the capturing of multiple frames (and eventually, the examination of their
independent effects) rather than attempting to pit the frames against each other on
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a per story basis.
2) Computer coding is better equipped to rigidly capture the nuances within
each story than human coding.
If we use a computerized content analysis software package, not only can we
can look within a story for multiple frames and multiple directions a story might
capture, but we can also ensure a strict standard by which stories are judged. A
computer program will give the scholar the same results every time a group of sto-
ries is analyzed. Multiple human coders, however, might read stories differently.
Computer coding guarantees consistency of analysis across stories. Computerized
content analysis also allows me to set up decision rules that make sure I get the
versions of words I am looking for and not the opposite meanings.
Determining the Questions to Be Asked
Now that I have established my decision rules for determining how to analyze
thirty years of stories about Congress, I must address what I am specifically looking
for within these stories. Put simply, I am looking for words and phrases that fit
the game and governing frames explained in detail in Chapter II.11 Before we finally
let the computerized process run, we must determine the most useful output of the
analysis. In this case, we rely on simple frequency counts of game and governing
language. We must also decide how we want these frequencies to be summed; in
the case of this chapter, quarterly frequency counts are chosen, but this decision is a
flexible one. We could look at weekly counts, monthly counts, yearly counts, or by
document counts; it all depends on how we choose to analyze the entirety of our data
11For lists of specific words and phrases used in the content analysis, consult the appendix. A
survey asking college students to match these words and phrases to broad framing concepts was
successfully conducted in the Spring of 2008 and found congruence between frames offered and
language considered.
52
and how we construct the files of content we choose to let the computer program
survey.
When it comes to capturing the governing frame of media coverage of Congress,
I seek out two broad types of ideas: words and phrases that capture issues and words
and phrases that capture legislative activity (defined constitutionally, almost like a
glossary of legislative terms). Figure 3 illustrates the presence of these words in
coverage of Congress over time. It provides a raw count of words present that fit my
conception of the governing frame.
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Figure 3: Number of Governing References, 1977-2006
A look at the presence of governing coverage over time shows us that there is a
great deal of movement from quarter to quarter in terms of how the media addresses
issues and the nuts and bolts of how a bill becomes a law. There appears to be a
slight downward movement in the series of mentions of governing terms, but that
movement appears to have leveled off somewhat over the past ten years. The most
noticeable movement within the series occurs in the mid 1990s.
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When it comes to seeking out the game frame of media coverage of Congress,
I am looking for words and phrases that capture conflict and consensus within the
House and Senate. This leads to a search for a list of words that illustrate disagree-
ment and agreement. Figure 4 shows us the prevalence of game frame word usage
by the media over time. It delivers a raw count of game words from 1977 to 2006.
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Figure 4: Number of Game References, 1977-2006
The movement of game references over time appears much steadier than the
movement of governing references. The number per quarter in the late 1970s us al-
most always between 500 and 1000 references; the same holds true for 2001 onward.
Two areas of note in this figure are the mid 1990s and the late 1990s/early 2000s,
two periods of high partisan contentiousness. One interesting fact we also should
point out when it comes to game coverage is that, unlike in the sphere of campaign
coverage by the media, game coverage has not necessarily surpassed governing cov-
erage. Governing coverage is consistently higher than game coverage when it comes
to Congress, a fact that might be surprising to some individuals who have offered
ad hoc theories that coverage of Congress is swamped by discussions of how the two
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parties are not getting along and working.12
For the purposes of ease of analysis, these game and governing volumes per
quarter will be scaled to groups of 100 references. Examining the effects of one
additional word or phrase per quarter would not offer us much theoretical leverage,
whereas thinking about language in terms of hundreds of words or phrases is far
easier to conceptualize. We can see how one hundred game or governing words
might translate into a few extra game- or governing related paragraphs or stories per
month and as such can envision how this volume of reporting might more easily be
picked up by those taking in the efforts of the mass media.
Beyond the potential effects of media coverage on assessments of Congress,
there are other potential factors that are known or are believed to drive how Ameri-
cans evaluate the legislative branch. These factors include the actions that legislators
perform each and every day in the House and Senate, the reactions of other branches
of government, external social factors, and past evaluations delivered by Americans.
The activities of Congress itself have the potential to explain the branch’s pop-
ularity. When Congress shows they are accomplishing tasks, they might be sending
the signal that they are doing the jobs they were elected to do and therefore might
be worthy of a reward via improved public favor. One such signal of accomplishment
Congress could send would be the passage of bills. The content of the bills might
not matter; as Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht (1997) state, a passage of a bill equals
a gain for someone in the general public; thus, the more bills that are passed means
the more people are receiving improvements in some form. Including a variable that
captures the number of bills Congress passes each quarter, therefore, is a good way
12While the governing and game series do move together to some extent, correlation of the two
series does not reach a level at which multicollinearity is a fear.
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to capture congressional outputs. Such a variable is included in my approval model;
it is a simple count of the number of bills passed by the House and Senate, not
necessarily the number of bills signed into law. It only counts bills passed by both
chambers and not bills passed by a single chamber.
In addition to general levels of bill passage, larger signs that the totality of gov-
ernment is functioning smoothly might drive Americans to believe that government
is working for them. One such signal would be the presence of unified or nondivided
government. When all branches of government are controlled by the same political
party, the potential for legislation to move without hindrance from entrance in a
chamber of Congress to the desk of the President for signature is heightened. Non-
divided government is not a guarantor of political harmony, but it does create a
clear alliance between lawmaking and law adopting. In this study, dummy variables
are included to capture the presence of unified government, defined as one party
control of the House, Senate, and presidency. This captures the following time pe-
riods: 1977:1-1980:4, 1993:1-1994:4, 2001:1-2001:2 and 2003:1-2006:4. The variable
captures the potential change in approval of Congress by coding the first quarter of
this unified government as a 1 and all other quarters through the data as a 0.13
Not all signals Congress sends, however, are so positive. Just as often (and
perhaps more often) as the members of Congress work to pass legislation, so too
do they work to stem the tide of legislative changes. At times, this is simply done
by not letting legislation progress from introduction to committee to a floor vote,
but capturing these legislative delays might be difficult. Looking instead at highly
visible gestures of slowing bills from votes might therefore be a better option. A
variable is included in the model to capture cloture votes, which serve as a sign that
13Coding unified government in several other ways did not produce substantively different results.
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filibusters, perhaps the strongest outward signals of congressional obstruction and
gridlock. The variable is a raw count of cloture votes actually taken per quarter and
does not capture moves toward cloture votes.
Signs that the gears of government have ground to a halt have the potential to
shape how Americans assess their representation. Congressional overrides of presi-
dential vetoes have the potential to show that the Congress is relevant and vital in
the face of constitutional controls established to hold the legislative branch back. On
the other hand, the number of presidential vetoes per quarter sends the reverse signal
to Americans. Vetoes potentially show the public that congressional action is being
denied; as such, the power and esteem of Congress has the potential to be diminished
in the eyes of the public. Measures of vetoes and overrides per quarter are included
to capture this give and take between the executive and legislative branches. I create
two variables here, one a raw count of vetoes per quarter and the other a count of
vetoes overriden per quarter.
When it comes to assessing the shape that congressional approval and trust
takes over time, it is also important to factor in specific events that might negatively
shake the foundations of support. Following the lead of Durr, Gilmour, and Wol-
brecht?, I include dummy variables that capture the potential power of congressional
scandals to alter perceptions of congressional strength. These scandals include Ko-
reagate (1977:1-1978:4), ABSCAM (1980:3-1982:1), Keating Five (1990:3-1991:4),
House Bank (1991:3-1992:3), House Post Office Investigation (1992:2-1992:4), and
the congressional lobbying scandal (2005:1-2006:4). Only scandals lasting multi-
ple quarters and encompassing multiple members of Congress were included in the
model. The scandals are separated into distinct variables and are given a value of
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1 in each quarter the scandal was present.14 Specific events also have the potential
to drive approval in a positive direction. Just as the President benefits from “rally
around the flag” sentiments, so too might the House and Senate. Therefore, I include
one dummy variables to capture events that might drive approval of Congress in a
positive direction. This variable captures the September 11 attack and the inva-
sion of Afghanistan (2001:3-2001:4). This variable is coded similarly to the scandal
variables, with a 1 in each quarter the event is present.
As both Patterson and Caldeira (1990) and Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht
(1997) show, the fates of Congress are not so easily divorced from the fates of other
branches of government. Key to their analyses of public esteem of Congress is a belief
that views of the President are tied to views of Congress. Therefore, it is essential to
include a measure of presidential approval in any model that seeks to explain what
drives the public’s trust in and approval of the legislative branch. The measure of
presidential approval used in this model utilizes Gallup polling data from the final
month of each quarter over the thirty years examined.
On the other hand, some factors that shape approval of government are factors
that, in some part, are out of the hands of legislators. One such variable is the eco-
nomic expectations of Americans. Congress can pass laws that affect the economic
future of the United States, but economic conditions may or may not be ultimately
related to these laws. Despite this, politicians are expected to improve the financial
state of the nation and its citizens. As Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht hypothesize
(and show to be valid in their model of congressional approval), just as Americans
hold the President responsible for economic conditions, so too do they hold legislators
responsible for such fates. A measure of economic expectations similar to that of the
14Creating and employing a variable that captures all scandals into a single measure instead of
using multiple measures does not substantively change the results.
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authors mentioned above is included as a control on the ebb and flow of congressional
assessments. The measure of economic expectations included here is the Index of
Consumer Sentiment measure taken by the University of Michigan Survey of Con-
sumers.15 It captures consumer opinions about several economic subjects, including
their own financial situation as well as broader national financial situations.
We know, however, that there is a relationship between presidential approval
and economic expectations that might devalue efforts to directly study the effects
of these variables on congressional assessments. We must, therefore, take steps to
divorce the effect of economic assessments on presidential approval from the overall
models. In order to do so, I regress presidential approval on economic expectations
to remove the potential directionality issues.16 This leaves me with a more pure
measure of presidential approval with which to gauge effects on congressional job
approval.
It is also essential to include a measure of congressional approval at the time
point prior to each quarter being examined here. Rarely would we expect huge move-
ment in approval from one quarter to the next, and more often than not evaluations
will be based on information drawn from experiences in the recent past. We should
expect the relationship between past and current approval to be a powerfully strong
one. A measure of this nature also serves another purpose, in that it captures past
values of the other variables in the model. As such, I include a lagged version of
congressional approval as a nod toward the potentially glacial movement of approval
over time and the changing rates of decay when it comes to the effects of multiple
competing factors.
15This measure can be found at http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu.
16Like De Boef and Keele (2008) but unlike Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht (1997), I do not
multiply this variable by negative one based on the unification or division of government.
59
Methods
Attempts to model approval over time have grown more sophisticated with each
passing attempt. Parker (1977) and Patterson and Caldeira (1990) use a very simple
multivariate model. Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht improve greatly on these at-
tempts through their use of distributed-lag models. They theorize that congressional
approval will be “a function of current and past values” of exogenous variables in-
cluded in the model; this modeling choice allows for more recent outcomes to account
for “greater change than those more distant” (p. 193). This distributed-lag modeling
regresses the dependent variable (approval) on both lagged measures of approval and
exogenous explanatory variables that are measured contemporaneously. Including a
lagged dependent variable in a model in this fashion has been the source of much
consternation (for a detailed explanation of the questions surrounding this modeling
choice, see Keele and Kelly (2006)), but for over a decade, the distributed-lag path
toward explaining congressional approval went unchallenged.
De Boef and Keele, in a January 2008 piece in the American Journal of Political
Science, offer a different strategy when it comes to choosing a time series model, one
that should be heeded especially when it comes to examining opinion over time. The
authors point out some specific mistakes often made in modeling that prove useful for
our endeavors here. De Boef and Keele, in reviewing time series regression choices
over a ten year period from 1995 to 2005, find that many authors use restrictive
models without explaining why. This choice, in their opinion, “suggests a potential
for bias” (p. 186). De Boef and Keele suggest authors take a look at error correction
models (or ECMs) as a less restrictive choice when it comes to time series. ECMs,
according to the authors, are often times so associated with cointegration that they
are immediately cast aside when it comes to the use of stationary data. However,
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proofs have shown that cointegration is not a requirement for the use of ECMs. If we
are seeking to, as De Boef and Keele put it, “estimate and test for both short- and
long-run effects and to compute a variety of quantities that help us better understand
politics” (p. 191), ECMs might provide the most fruitful path through this context.
In choosing between an autoregressive distributed-lag model (or ADL) and an ECM,
the authors claim that the ECM allows for a “tighter link between theory and model”
(p. 195) along with three readily available metrics: short-run effects, the long-run
multiplier, and the error correction rate. It also minimizes questions surrounding
invalid restrictions that can prove problematic.
As described by Kelly (2005), ECMs are useful when theory “suggests a de-
pendent variable responds to short-term changes in independent variables and/or
maintains a long-term level consistent with these variables” (p. 873). There can,
therefore, be both immediate effects and effects distributed over time. If we were
talking about ECMs in a bivariate sense, we would be testing a formula that resem-
bles the one below:
∆Yt = β1∆Xt−i − β2(Yt−1 − β3Xt−1 − γ) + εt
Kelly interprets the above equation as follows. The goal is to examine “the
effect of changes in X and the level of X in comparison to Y” (p. 873). In the
equation, β2 captures the error correction rate; in other words, it “captures how
quickly discrepancies in the equilibrium distance between X and Y are eliminated” (p.
873). β1 measures the short-run relationship between X and Y. β3 measures the long-
run relationship between X and Y. In addition, γ is the “distance between variables
when in their equilibrium state” (p. 873). Since our model here is multivariate, we
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assume a formula like the one above but with an X for each potential determinant
of congressional approval.
De Boef and Keele go one step further in terms of guiding the analysis to be
performed here in this chapter, in that they replicate the Durr, Gilmour, and Wol-
brecht findings using both an ADL and an ECM in addition to the results originally
reported in the 1997 piece. The ECM version of modeling congressional approval
reveals some new findings that will be important to keep in mind as we execute
a model including game and governing framing, namely that presidential approval
has an immediate effect, economic expectations have a long-run effects, and the
Durr/Gilmour/Wolbrecht media measure has almost equal short- and long-run ef-
fects.
Following in the footsteps of the error correction model used by De Boef and
Keele in replicating Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht, this chapter will also use an error
correction model in estimating congresssional job approval. Regardless of whether or
not the findings reveal short- or long-run significance, an ECM should prove useful
here given the use of quarterly data (in other words, a great deal of memory is built
into each quarter, so even short-run significant results speak to something). Like De
Boef and Keele, I will report short- and long run-results for media coverage, presi-
dential approval, and economic expectations, but I will also include information that
captures these types of effects for the other hypotheses Durr, Gilmour, and Wol-
brecht test, namely the ideas that congressional outputs, governmental situations,
and events and crises matter.
Findings
Findings for the error correction model of congressional job approval are located
in Table 2.
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Table 2: Media Framing and Congressional Approval, 1977-2006
Long Run Short Run
Predictors Effects Effects
Congressional Approvalt−1 -0.273* (.069)
Game Framing -.623 (.421) -.819* (.351)
Governing Framing .130 (.119) .222* (.101)
Presidential Approval .092 (.081) .122* (.069)
Economic Expectations .184* (.066) .233* (.102)
Bills Passed .010 (.019) .029* (.016)
Cloture Votes .013 (.146) -.029 (.098)
Vetoes .439* (.260) .245 (.177)
Veto Overrides .503 (1.757) -.579 (1.354)
No Divided Government: 1977-1980 4.791 (7.527) 2.231 (4.978)
No Divided Government: 1993-1994 -18.399* (8.449) -14.770* (7.222)
No Divided Government: 2001:1 12.829* (6.894) 7.706* (4.510)
No Divided Government: 2003-2004 .833 (6.438) -.964 (4.505)
Scandal: Koreagate -3.868* (2.223) 3.543 (5.427)
Scandal: ABSCAM 1.910 (2.068) 5.415* (3.201)
Scandal: Keating Five -1.970 (3.019) 5.071 (3.798)
Scandal: House Bank -1.650 (4.528) -4.511 (4.007)
Scandal: House Post Office -2.056 (5.469) -10.620* (6.304)
Scandal: Lobbying -3.077 (1.921) -1.191 (4.314)
Event: September 11 12.174* (4.291) 6.862* (3.904)
Constant -4.141 (5.768)
N 119
Adjusted R-Squared .292
Note: Data are quarterly, 1977:1 to 2006:4. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* = p < 0.05, one-tailed tests.
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Taking a look at the results, we find immediately that both hypotheses pre-
sented earlier are validated. Game framing has a negative and significant effect on
congressional job approval. According to the numbers, for every one hundred ad-
ditional game references per quarter, congressional approval decreases by just over
four-fifths of a percent.17 In essence, when the news media discuss congressional
activity as a game in which conflict and compromise are the outcomes sought by
strategic actors and parties, the legislative branch suffers. This relationship between
game framing and congressional approval is a short-run relationship in which the
effects do not last into the future.
While the presence of game langauge is shown to have a negative effect on
congressional job approval, the presence of governing language is shown to have an
opposite effect. For every one hundred media references in a quarter to governing,
approval increases by two-tenths of a percent.18In essence, the discussion of Congress
working on legislation and dealing with issues positively alters the assessments Amer-
icans deliver concerning the legislative branch. Similarly to game coverage, however,
these effects only exist in the short-run; they do not persist long after they are de-
livered by the mass media. These findings, taken in total, show that specific types
of media matter in driving approval of Congress over time. The language the mass
media utilize in covering Congress has a distinct and nuanced effect on the ways in
which Americans examine their government.
The results of this model of congressional approval also bear out, for the most
part, the findings of Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht (1997) and De Boef and Keele
17It is important to point out that an increase of one hundred game references could happen quite
easily; on average, there are 776 game references per quarter.
18As with game references, it is important to point out that an increase of one hundred governing
references in a three month span could happen quite easily; on average, I find over 2700 governing
references per quarter.
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(2008) when it comes to the role presidential approval and economic expectations
play in driving congressional approval in both the short- and long-run. When it
comes to presidential approval, I find a short-run relationship between support for
the president and support for Congress; when support for the president increases,
so too does support for Congress. These findings support the earlier error correc-
tion model performed by De Boef and Keele (which contradicted the non-findings of
Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht). Like both sets of authors, I too find that economic
expectations matter; unlike both sets of authors, I fund a multifaceted relationship
between these expectations and congressional approval. Here, economic expectations
matter in both the short-run and the long-run; when economic expectations go up,
Congress is rewarded with positive job assessments on the part of the public. The
power of these positive expectations affects approval immediately, and it also con-
tinues to affect approval across future time periods; the results show, however, that
the immediate effect is the strong effect of the two.
When it comes to the effects of actual congressional actions on the job approval
of Congress, the findings are quite mixed. It appears that actually getting things
done matters, as bill passage has a short-run effect on congressional job approval.
When Congress passes more bills, they are rewarded with higher approval. These
findings differ from those of Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht, who find no relationship.
Similarly to these authors, however, I find that vetoes have an positive and significant
effect on congressional job approval; interestingly though, this relationship exists in
the long-run. This might suggest that inter-branch conflict has effects that persist,
unlike measures of intra-branch conflict like bill passage. Like Durr, Gilmour, and
Wolbrecht, I find no relationship between cloture votes and congressional job ap-
proval; unlike these authors, however, I find no relationship between veto overrides
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and congressional job approval.
The results linking governmental situations and congressional job approval bear
out the idea that, at certain times, unified government can have wildly different effects
on how Americans view their legislative branch. The period of unified government in
the late 1970s appears to have no effect on congressional job approval. The period of
unified government in the 1990s, however, had an impressively negative effect on how
individuals responded to a period of complete Democratic rule. The presence of this
unified government from quarter one of 1993 to quarter four of 1994 had both short-
and long-run negative consequences for the public perception of Congress. These
results differ from those of Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht. Interestingly, the single
quarter of unified Republican government in the first quarter of 2001 had the exact
opposite effect; here, both short- and long run- results show a positive effect of this
change in control. A return to unified government under Republican control after
the 2002 elections (i.e from the first quarter of 2003 through the last quarter of 2006)
showed no similar spark in terms of boosting approval for Congress.19
As for scandals and events, the findings are similar to those of the look at gov-
ernmental situations in that they are mixed. The Koreagate scandal of the late 1970s
has a significant negative long-run effect on congressional job approval; these find-
ings, to some extent, bear out findings of Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht, who found
a negative significant relationship between the two in their distributed-lag model.
Inexplicably, however, the scandal that followed the Koreagate scandal in Congress,
the ABSCAM scandal, comes back positively related to congressional job approval
in the short-run. The only other scandal found to significantly affect assessments of
the legislative branch is the Post Office scandal in the House in the early 1990s; this
19Removing the media measures from the model has no substantive effects on significance or signs
of the competing explanations
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scandal had negative, short-run effects on approval. The Keating Five and House
Bank scandals of the early 1990s and the Abramoff Lobbying scandals of the mid
2000s were not found to be related to the measure of job approval. In terms of spe-
cific potential “rally around the flag” events, the model tests only one: the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. The model finds that there was rallying around the
flag in both the short- and long-run; the long-run positive effects were nearly double
the effects in the short-run.
Taking a look at the findings in total, we can conclude several things. The
mass media matter in very specific ways: game coverage and governing coverage
have opposite effects that push approval downward and upward respectively. The
media only matter in the short-term however. Other governmental entities matter
(i.e. the President), as does the economy. Congress can affect its own fate, but only
through passing bills and sometimes via falling into the trap of scandal; Congress can
also be affected, by both the actions of others (i.e. through vetoes) and through the
results of elections (unifying government behind one ideology) and national events.
Implications
The most clear-cut message we can take away from the findings of the error
correction model of congressional job approval in this chapter is that, as expected
and predicted, the media matter. When the media use language that fits the game
frame of coverage, approval of Congress is driven downward. Game terms touch
at a raw nerve of the general public that is tired of politicians who are caught up
in conflict and are too willing to sell out and compromise their ideals. Americans
respond to these types of depictions of the legislative branch in markedly negative
fashion. These effects are not long lasting effects, but they are significant. On the
other hand, when the media uses language that fits the governing frame of coverage,
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approval of Congress is enhanced in the short-run. Governing terms assuage the
public’s need for issues to be addressed, policies to be presented, and work to be
ongoing and performed stealthily, to borrow a phrase from Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse (2002). When the media describe Congress in these terms, Congress benefits
when it comes to the assessments delivered by the American people; this benefit may
be short lived statistically, but it is a benefit that must be appreciated nonetheless
(especially given Congress’s seemingly nonexistent ability to get its head above water
in terms of public opinion of its performance).
We also should not ignore findings beyond those of the crux of our argument
(that the media matter). Results show that a wide variety of factors that lie in
and out of the hands of members of the House and Senate matter when it comes
to what drives positive and negative assessments of the place in which they work.
Bill passage matters in the short-term and in positive fashion; the extent to which
bills can be and are passed is something that is left entirely for Congress to decide.
Economic expectations have both short- and long-term effects on how the public
perceive Congress; this suggests that perhaps if Congress can spur economic changes
for the better, these polling benefits can be perpetual. This is obviously more difficult
for Congress to control than, say, bill passage. Electoral outcomes shape approval,
in that periods of unified government show markedly different effects on job approval
that are based on the dynamics of the times; the unification of government behind
one party is something members of Congress work for, but cannot guarantee. The
fate of Congress is also found to be linked to that of the President (both in terms
of short-run effects of presidential approval and long-run effects of vetoes). It seems,
therefore, that just like with the relationship between what Congress does and what
the media cover, Congress is clearly not in control of its own approval-related destiny;
68
it is inextricably linked to the actions of other political actors. The effects of this
link may not last long, but the link remains.
More importantly, perhaps, the macro-level results here begin to answer the
question of how the media might be driving Fenno’s paradox. So long as the media
continue to address the bargaining aspects of congressional activity, the give and
take between members of Congress and between chambers within Congress, and
the seemingly inevitable conflict between individuals and factions, it is difficult to
envision congressional job approval rebounding. Congress has no ombudsman, as
it were, to promote itself, its focus on issues, and its policy production; as long
as the media write the narrative of what Congress is doing and as long as that
narrative contains and focuses to some extent on elements of conflict and compromise,
Congress, barring events that artificially inflate opinion, might be perpetually stuck
in the morass of low approval.
Individual members of Congress, on the other hand, do have a path toward
boosting their image in the eyes of constituents. The standards of judgment when it
comes to the performance of members of Congress are, as Fenno claimed, different.
As we will see in Chapter IV, the role the mass media play in shaping these standards
of judgment is a role that competes with the ability of each member of Congress to
promote themselves and their accomplishments. This competition of information
ensures a whole different relationship when it comes to the potential effects of game
and governing on Fenno’s paradox.
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CHAPTER IV
MEDIA FRAMING AND SENATORIAL APPROVAL
From the moment an individual is elected to Congress, he or she is already
thinking about how to get re-elected to Congress. Part of the strategy undertaken
by these re-election seeking members is completely under the members control, but
scholars remain conscious of the fact that although members would like to personally
tell every constituent what has been accomplished and what will be accomplished,
for the most part members of Congress must rely on outsiders to spread the message.
Just as with Congress, legislators must be concerned with how they are portrayed by
newspapers in their home states. However, while Congress has no entity attempting
to ensure it receives positive press, individual members of Congress work to control
the information flow concerning them through the way the approach the job, the
issues they work on, and the level to which they get involved in party and parti-
san politics. This chapter examines how game and governing framing might affect
individual members of Congress (specifically senators) and the level to which con-
stituents approve or disapprove of them. As with congressional approval, it is shown
that game and governing framing matter, but the specific dynamics reveal that they
matter in different ways.
In the early months of 2006, Virginia Senator George Allen had what many
would call a bright and boundless political future ahead of him. After winning his
Senate seat in a narrow victory over an incumbent slightly over five years earlier,
Allen had become a rising star within his party, serving as a fundraising chair in a
year of Republican successes and even being mentioned in some circles as a potential
presidential candidate in 2008. Perhaps more importantly for his role as junior
Senator of Virginia, he was viewed by those in his state and in Washington as a hard
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worker who accomplished much of what he set out to accomplish and as someone
able to deliver on promises to those who sent him to Washington in the first place.
As such, he consistently enjoyed levels of approval of the job he was doing as Senator
of nearly sixty percent (and gaps between positive and negative approval of nearly
thirty percent) from the citizens of his state. Moreover, he enjoyed a generally
friendly relationship with the media, never falling victim to what one might consider
to be highly problematic coverage.
Within less than a year’s time, however, George Allen found himself not only off
the short list of potential seekers of the White House, but also out of a job altogether.
The rigors of the campaign season proved too much for Allen, who succumbed to
several scandalous moments and stories that at times overshadowed the national and
local issues salient to citizens. Negative opinion of him rose nearly twenty percent
throughout the summer and fall of 2006, much of that movement coinciding with the
candidate’s public relations disasters. While these scandalous moments and stories
were of Allen’s own doing (and not mere media creations), the inability of Allen to
steer the media away from a troublesome narrative and back toward a substantive
narrative has been cited as a major pitfall in his re-election efforts. His re-election
story went from a local story to a national story, from a story about governing to a
story about the game surrounding him. He could not control the message the media
put forth, and in the end the message controlled him.
Americans tend to like their member of Congress, at least until given reasons
not to. Media narratives and decision-making processes reinforce this facet of public
opinion. Allen’s story is only one of many stories of politicians whose careers have
been shaped by the stories the media choose to cover and the ways in which the
media cover them, but it is particularly illustrative of how quickly the story of who a
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politician is and what he is doing can change, and so too public opinion. Politicians
are dependent on the media to assist them in conveying their positions, beliefs, and
actions to the general public; however, they cannot control this flow of information.
As such, they are subject to the decision-making processes media outlets undertake
in determining what information is salient and what is not (or, as often the case may
be, what information will help sell newspapers and what will not). Unlike Congress
as a whole (which has no sort of ombudsman looking out for its best interests),
however, individual members of Congress do have a lever of control over the media.
Members of the House and Senate, in that they decide how they will act and when
they will offer up information that could potentially be reported on by newspapers
and television stations, essentially have a good deal of sway over what the pool of
potential stories the media might pick and choose from looks like. This fact creates
a sort of uneasy symbiosis between the political mass media and elected officials, a
relationship in which both need each other to survive in one way or another, yet
both are not necessarily looking for an equal partnership and instead are looking to
be the dominant player in the coupling.
Why Do Members of Congress Care About the Media?
If members of Congress are, as David Mayhew claims, “single minded seekers of
re-election” (Mayhew 1974), they must employ a wide variety of strategies in accom-
plishing the goal of keeping their jobs and ensuring easier paths toward re-election
in the future. Mayhew points to three such paths: advertising, credit claiming, and
position taking. These paths do not exist in a vacuum, however; they are exposed
to the efforts of outsiders to promote or dissuade citizens to buy into the message
the member of Congress is selling. One such outsider that might help or harm a
legislator’s efforts to advertise, claim credit, and take positions is the mass media.
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The relationship between the advertising, credit claiming, and position taking
functions that members of Congress employ and the potential for the mass media
to enhance these functions is fairly straightforward and is increasingly part of the
congressional re-election “playbook” as it were. In lieu of paying for media time to
get one’s name out to the masses, point out what one has delivered for the district,
and clearly state where one stands on the issues, members of Congress are increas-
ingly hopeful that if they make their outreach efforts interesting enough, they will
be covered by newspapers and television stations, earning them “free media” as it
were. Advertising, which Mayhew defines as “disseminating one’s name” to “create
a favorable image” is something politicians often do through their use of television
advertisements and direct mail during campaign season or through newsletters sent
to constituents thanks to the the powers of the franking privilege, but its goals can
be accomplished just as easily through being mentioned in a newspaper story in con-
junction with something happening in the home district or on Capitol Hill. Credit
claiming can be undertaken through similar politician-sponsored media purchases,
or even through the giving of speeches, but it can also be derived through an associa-
tion publicized in a news story between a specific member of Congress and a specific
distributive project delivered to a district through federal legislation. Position taking
is often performed through talking directly to small crowds of individuals or through
directly debating foes, but the magnitude of those reached by such talking and de-
bating can be increased when the contents or key moments are picked up by a print
or television reporter.
It is patently obvious that this link between what politicians must accomplish
to build the electoral connection and what resources the mass media offer exists, but
it leads one to wonder how the media reacts to elected officials and their attempts
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to thrust themselves into the media spotlight in a manner favorable to their future
prospects. An examination of the minimal literature on how the media actually
do cover specific members of Congress will offer greater insight into the successes
of elected officials when it comes to their efforts to garner name recognition, tie
themselves to beneficial legislative outcomes, and make their feelings known on the
salient issues of our time.
What We Know About Legislator Coverage
Members of Congress hope that the media will tell their stories, but ceding the
bulk of that power to the media comes at a price, namely the potential to lose control
of how that story develops. Scholars are beginning to learn about how members of
Congress are faring when it comes to this tradeoff, but we still seem to know very
little about how the mass media cover individual members of Congress over time.
Detailed, systematic examination of media outputs in this realm seems to be limited
to the work of R. Douglas Arnold, who content analyzes media coverage of House
members in his 2004 book Congress, the Press, and Political Accountability. What
we do know from this work, however, is limited in terms of both media scope (only
examining newspaper coverage and not television coverage or burgeoning resources
like the internet), legislative scope (only examining twenty-six of four hundred thirty-
five members), and time (only examining coverage within a two year period). Despite
these empirical setbacks, thanks to Arnold’s work, we can begin to draw some basic
and potentially useful conclusions about what media coverage of legislators looks
like.
One key finding in Arnold’s work (a finding of particular interest to legislators
seeking media paths toward securing the electoral connection) is that newspaper cov-
erage of representatives is a “regular event” (Arnold 2004). The median newspaper
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mentions local representatives once every two days on average, and this level of cov-
erage is fairly constant over a two year period (increasing slightly during what we
might call the campaign season). This level of coverage is also not driven by ideol-
ogy (conservatives get no more or less coverage than liberals), gender, or race. In
addition, this coverage is predominantly news coverage, and not coverage via other
channels (i.e. editorials, opinion columns, or letters to the editor).
Members of Congress are being covered regularly, but it is important to know
what this regular coverage looks like. Another finding in Arnold’s work that should
be encouraging to elected officials hoping that the media will serve as a conduit of
information is that of the articles in which they are covered, representatives are the
main subject of the article forty percent of the time (Arnold 2005). Even when
representatives are not the main subject of the article, politically useful and relevant
information about them is conveyed to the reading public. These findings make the
following clear: representatives are not just part of the story, but in many cases they
and their actions are the story itself.
Above and beyond covering members of Congress and covering them promi-
nently, the content of coverage the media delivers is of the utmost importance. Mem-
bers of Congress cannot adhere to the concept that all press is good press; they need
both quantity and quality (i.e. favorability) when it comes to the attention they
receive from newspapers and television stations if they are looking for an easier path
toward ensuring re-election. Arnold’s examination of the content of media coverage
reveals that position taking on the part of representatives is regularly covered, as is
roll-call voting (Arnold 2004). In other words, high profile moments of expressing
positions are the moments that newspapers seek to capture. On the other hand,
newspapers seem less interested in covering bill introduction, committee work, and
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leadership work.
A question less examined in general, however, is the link between media cov-
erage of members of Congress and accountability, which we can think of in terms
of both electoral outcomes and assessments like job approval, trust, and confidence.
Arnold’s study does examine linkages between the volume of media coverage and
individual-level recollections of reading about challengers and incumbents, discover-
ing that incumbents have a huge advantage in terms of volume of coverage and that
this disparity drives the ability of citizens to remember reading about candidates;
this relationship holds even in the face of campaign-related controls. The volume of
newspaper coverage is also found to drive the propensity of individuals to be able to
assess an incumbent or challenger in terms of ideology and likes or dislikes. These
findings are salient to campaign dynamics; it is evident that on top of the financial
mountain challengers must climb in order to be competitive, they must also deal
with the obstacle of the lack of name recognition being reinforced by media decision-
making. However, they tell us little as to how media coverage drives the decisions
that individuals make, be those decisions to pull the lever for one candidate instead
of another on election day or to state unequivocally that they like their member of
Congress or loathe them.
Game, Governing, and Senatorial Approval
Why should we expect media coverage (and, more specifically for our efforts
here, the content of that coverage) to matter when it comes to moments in which
individual citizens can begin to hold their elected officials accountable? I argue
that we should expect such a relationship because of the media’s firm grasp on
the dynamics of information flow between what is happening both at home and
in Washington (with regard to the activities and accomplishments of members of
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Congress) and what is read, heard, and potentially absorbed by Americans. The
media’s role as a gatekeeper of information provides Americans with, as Lippmann
(1922) once claimed, a flashlight and not a mirror when it comes to pointing out what
is taking place. When it comes to individual members of Congress, that flashlight is
far less powerful; what it is able to point out, therefore, has far more power to affect
perceptions.
As discussed in Chapter II, when it comes to gaining facts about elected of-
ficials, most Americans (provided they are even interested in gaining information
about politicians) have to look to others to gather details and weave them into a
broader, more coherent narrative; they are, as Zaller (1992, p.6) argues, “depen-
dent on unseen and usually unknown others for most of their information.” This
is especially the case when it comes to the day-to-day performance of a member of
Congress. Much of the work members of Congress perform within the chambers of
the House and Senate is difficult for the average American to understand. Even if
the majority of Americans did have a firm grasp on how the legislative process works,
the lack of transparency at times of this process lends itself to a state in which said
citizens would be thirsting for information but not necessarily able to find it. Pieces
of legislation are posted online and debates are often televised on C-SPAN and the
like, but rare is the American who has the time or the patience to weed through
ream upon ream of paper or hour upon hour of footage to find useful morsels of
information by which to assess the state of their representation. The prospects for
citizens within a constituency learning about the activities of their elected officials
when traveling back from Washington to the home district is equally grim. As Hall
(1996) points out, legislative time is short. As such, members of Congress can only
spend so much time in their home districts. They can only give so many speeches
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and shake so many hands. This places clear limits on the opportunities for direct
contact that individual constituents have with their elected officials.
For most members of Congress, it is the local media that weaves the narrative
of what an elected official is doing in Washington and is doing within the home dis-
trict. As Arnold (2004) claims, the national press does not make stars out of all five
hundred thirty-five members of the House and Senate. The burden falls to more lo-
calized sources to get the word out. Some scholars have shown anecdotally that this
is to the benefit of most politicians. Mutz and Flemming (1999) claim that the tone
of local coverage differs greatly from national coverage, resulting in less negativity,
while Robinson (1981) claims that the local press is generally “softer” than the na-
tional press. This positivity and softness translates neatly into the type of coverage
a member of Congress hopes to transmit to his or her constituents, namely a rela-
tively straightforward examination of successes and accomplishments said member
has achieved both nationally and locally. This is the essence of governing coverage (as
discussed in Chapter II) at the local level. Governing coverage for specific members
of Congress is coverage that ties them to issues and to legislative accomplishment;
it is coverage that links them to actually doing something of substance.
Why then does this matter in terms of accountability? It matters because,
short of knowing a member’s party identification and sharing it or not sharing it
with them, knowing what an elected official has done (or has not done) substantively
should serve as a useful heuristic by which to assess performance. Should the local
media be delivering a high volume of this substantive coverage, individuals should
be increasingly able to find ways in which to support their elected officials. Should
members of Congress suffer in their ties to substantive accomplishments, they might
find themselves struggling to explain to the people they represent what they are
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actually doing (seeing as the job of Representative or Senator can be difficult to
capture and convey succinctly). In sum, members of Congress receiving high levels
of governing coverage should be individuals rewarded by constituents with high levels
of approval. More formally, therefore, I argue the following:
Hypothesis 1: Higher levels of local newspaper coverage of governing frame
activities with respect to a specific senator lead to higher senatorial job approval.
On the other hand, members of Congress are hoping to avoid being tied publicly
an opposite dynamic, namely the old adage that “government in action” is “govern-
ment inaction.” Since, as scholars have argued, the local press in the past has been
overwhelmingly favorable to politicians representing the area in which said press op-
erates, the presence of negative information involving a member of Congress should
be especially noteworthy and alarming to citizens. It breaks a pattern of coverage
and casts the member in a new and unflattering light. Game coverage (as discussed
in Chapter II) at the local level captures such media dynamics. It assesses a member
of Congress and his or her ties to the types of problems that have led Mann and
Ornstein (2006) to reiterate the idea that Congress is broken: the personal missteps,
the infighting, the squabbling, the intractability of certain individuals, the slowness
of the process, and the inability to deliver accomplishments, be they localized or
nationalized. It also, as Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) point out, can paint a
member of Congress as willing to capitulate and give in rather than hold fast to his
or her ideals.
The possibility of game coverage to affect accountability takes root in the sheer
fact that it changes the perceptions of the average citizen. As Fenno (1975) points
out, Americans tend to like their member of Congress. Increases in media coverage
that describes their representative as a part of the problem and not part of the
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solution might begin to erode that approval of one’s elected officials that has been
impressive over time. It runs counter to the general perception that one’s member
of Congress is a likeable person who is generally doing good work for a district or a
state. Members burdened by high levels of game coverage should also be burdened
by lower approval levels than those free of media-based associations with infighting
and gridlock. As such, I argue the following:
Hypothesis 2: Higher levels of local newspaper coverage of game frame ac-
tivities with respect to a specific senator lead to higher senatorial job approval.
Local media coverage may make up the bulk of media assessments of what a
member of Congress is doing and how he or she is doing it, but it does not make
up the entirety of the potential media narratives. The potential still remains for
members of Congress to be discussed on their own by national media sources or to
be swept up in the broader media narrative concerning the state of the legislative
branch as a whole. As such, being a part of national media coverage is a double-edged
sword for most members of Congress. Being mentioned by a national media outlet as
a major player in the success of a piece of legislation or in the movement on a specific
issue might trickle down into added benefits at the local level for a member of the
House or the Senate. On the other hand, as Mutz and Flemming (1999) note, when
a member of Congress gets mentioned by the national media, it increasingly seems
more often than not that it is for doing something wrong instead of doing something
right. National media sources are increasingly utilizing negative information in their
discussions of politics (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1998), and the follies of politicians
fit that frame perfectly. Becoming a major topic of discussion in more national
newspapers is most likely more trouble than it is worth for members of Congress,
who are focused on gaining the favor of their constituents and not the entire nation.
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Senators caught up in the national media news cycle might just be the senators
caught up in the troublesome interactions between party leaders over the process of
doing business. As such, I argue the following for the following relationships between
being discussed in the national press and the level of one’s approval standing within
a state:
Hypothesis 3: Higher levels of national newspaper coverage with respect to
a specific senator lead to lower senatorial job approval.
After inquiring into how game and governing framing separate senators with
high levels of approval from senators with low levels of approval, we also might
inquire into how game and governing might shape changes in approval from one
month to the next. Does media framing just separate those with high approval from
those with intermediate or low approval, or does it shape the movement of approval
from one month to the next? I argue that it should. Senators who receive high
levels of governing coverage should not only see high levels of approval (as argued
in Hypothesis 1), but they should also see their approval ratings increase from the
previous month. They should benefit from the local publicizing of their relationship
to legislative accomplishments and from association with highly salient issues in the
spotlight. High levels of governing coverage should reinforce feelings that the senator
is focusing on issues and getting things done; as such, they should lead not only to
higher approval for those typically rewarded but also higher approval than normal for
those that suffer from low levels of public favor. On the other hand, senators receiving
high levels of game coverage should also see declines in their approval in comparison
to the previous month. High levels of association with the squabbling that takes
place in congressional negotiation and between parties should cause senators with
low approval to fall further out of favor with their constituents and should penalize
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senators typically approved of by those that sent them to Washington. As such, the
following hypotheses will also be tested:
Hypothesis 4: Higher levels of local newspaper coverage of governing frame
activities lead to increases in approval from one month to the next.
Hypothesis 5: Higher levels of local newspaper coverage of game frame ac-
tivities lead to decreases in approval from one month to the next.
Measuring Framing and Senatorial Approval
In this examination of the relationship between media messages and opinion
of legislators, I will be looking solely at members of the United States Senate; this
decision is partly a function of the availability of data and partly a function of
the fact that examining the entire population of a political entity might offer a bit
more empirical leverage over the question of accountability than, say, a look at only a
sample of members would. To capture approval ratings for the senators in my model,
I will be relying on approval data taken from polling performed by SurveyUSA from
January 2006 to December 2006.20 SurveyUSA’s data is ideal for this examination of
approval because they poll all fifty states for eleven consecutive months; as such, they
are able to provide data on all one hundred senators. SurveyUSA’s approval question
is straightforward (asking to citizens of Alabama, for example, “Do you approve or
disapprove of the job Richard Shelby is doing as United States Senator?”), and their
sample size remains consistent (at 600 individuals) from survey to survey for each
senator in question. SurveyUSA asks this question for most senators from January to
November; however, for approximately one quarter of senators, they ask the question
into December as well. I see no theoretical or empirical reason not to include this data
in the model as well; it can only further add to our understanding of the phenomena
20More information on this data can be found at http://www.surveyusa.com/50StateTracking.html
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under examination.
A question naturally presents itself, however: how should this data best be
used to capture the differences from one senator to the next but also to capture the
differences for each individual senator from one portion of a year to another? One
might argue that aggregating approval data (and many of the independent variables
yet to be discussed) to the yearly level eliminates an examination of the interesting
(and at times substantive) movement in approval of senators from one month to
the next. Not every senator’s approval moves drastically over time, but some show
a remarkable ebb and flow that deserves explanation. Aggregating to a quarterly
level might also diminish our ability to tell a story about over time movement in
approval ratings. On the other hand, it could be argued that looking at this data
in monthly fashion might create another set of problems, namely that the nature of
the job of being a senator leads to temporal issues over the span of a year. If we
are arguing that what a senator does (or does not do) is at the heart of how that
senator is perceived, might a senator’s ability to take part in activities be shaped by
the fact that at times on the senatorial calendar, no work is being done and as such,
no new information is necessarily being generated on some of the members of the
Senate? Take for example the month of August, a time during which Congress often
is taking a vacation. Senators who are up for re-election might be the subject of
news stories, but those who are not might fall off the political map, especially since
at this time few members of Congress are generating press coverage and none are
generating legislation. I argue that this is not the problem that it might appear to be;
lack of Washington related activity in down times might be replaced by heightened
activity on the part of the senator in the state they represent. The same goes for
other recesses that take place throughout the calendar year, as well as periods of
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time when a senator is not in Washington (trips home on weekends, trips abroad,
and so forth). In choosing how to deal with these questions, I opt to use as much
of the data as possible (in essence, seeking to study as much potential movement in
opinion as possible) and examine each senator from month to month.
The clearest way of using this approval data, therefore, is to make monthly
job approval into a dependent variable that allows us to ask (and hopefully answer)
the question “what drives senatorial job approval?” with a handful of potential
explanatory variables. However, there are other ways of using this job approval
data that present themselves. One way to do so is to ask a related question: what
explanatory variables might drive change in a senator’s job approval from one month
to the next? If a senator’s approval goes up five points from one month to the next,
what might they have done (or what might have happened in covering what they
have done) in that month to spur that change? This allows us to use the SurveyUSA
approval data in two ways: one that attempts to explain why different senators have
different levels of approval at different points in time, and one that attempts to
explain why different senators’ approval increases or decreases at different points in
time.
The key independent variable of interest here is media coverage of the one
hundred senators in question. The models to be presented here, however, examine
media coverage in multiple ways. The first (and perhaps most important) path
of linking media coverage to senatorial approval is an examination of how local
newspapers cover the actions of members of the Senate. If, as former House Speaker
Tip O’Neill once stated, “all politics is local,” then it is at the local level where we
can expect the press to be seeking information on the activities of elected officials and
where we can expect media-based information to have the greatest effect on holding
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politicians accountable. It is not the presence or absence of coverage that matters
here for our question of what drives approval however; instead, it is the content
of what the local press are saying. Similar to the methods employed in Chapter
III, therefore, I employ computerized content analysis of local newspaper coverage
utilizing the concepts of game and governing frames of activity. This variable will
be also be constituted similarly to the examination of media frames of Congress as a
whole, whereby counts of words associated with the game and governing frame will
be used to gauge the level of game and governing coverage taking place concerning
a Senator within the specified time frame.
It is important, however, in examining local newspaper coverage, to make sure
I am examining the right type of local newspaper coverage. Simply picking a news-
paper in a state at random and analyzing its content would not be the best strategy
toward examining the potential for political accountability. Instead, a successful
model will seek out the most dominant media voice in each state, expecting that
these dominant sources of information are best equipped to deliver cues to individ-
ual citizens and as such shape opinion of elected officials. Therefore, for each of the
states under examination, I set out to examine content (via the Lexis-Nexis database)
from the newspaper with the highest circulation at the time the project was under-
taken.21 However, this is not always possible. For example, the Indianapolis Star,
the newspaper in Indiana with the highest circulation, is unavailable via Lexis-Nexis;
instead, I rely on the South Bend Tribune, which is available and is the third high-
est in circulation in that state. For almost every state in the model, I am able to
pull media coverage from a newspaper that is top three in circulation.22 There are,
21Circulation data are drawn from the Audit Bureau of Circulation and can be found online at
http://abcas3.accessabc.com/ecirc/newsform.asp.
22For a complete list of the newspapers chosen, see Appendix.
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unfortunately several states that do not have any major daily newspapers with cov-
erage available via Lexis-Nexis (seven states to be exact: Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, and South Dakota). Examining wire service usage
of news coverage from these states does not help fill the data gap, nor does searching
for other free online archives. These states are therefore omitted from the model at
this time due to these data limitations. Instead of examining data for one hundred
senators (across fifty states), we are left with eighty-six senators to study (across
forty three states).
Another concern is making sure that the choice of newspaper does not in any
way bias the potential levels of game and governing coverage of a senator. We
want to be certain that, for example, a newspaper located in a city considered to
be dominated by conservatives does not cover a Democrat in a noticeably different
fashion than a newspaper located in a city considered to be dominated by liberals.
For example, does Senator Barbara Boxer receive noticeably different coverage from
the San Diego Union Tribune than she does from the San Francisco Chronicle?
To guard against potential problems such as the example cited above, I inquired
into levels of monthly coverage (i.e. number of articles), as well as levels of game
and governing coverage over 2006 of Senator Boxer in both newspapers. All three
categories revealed relatively high correlations, signaling that the two newspapers,
despite regional differences in ideology, were similar in when they covered the senator
and how they covered the senator.
In using Lexis-Nexis archives to search for media coverage of senators under
examination, I opt for the broadest parameters possible. Coverage in the news section
or on the front page of a newspaper has the potential to shape views of a politician
as coverage, but so might coverage in a section entirely devoted to local news. We
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have no reason to believe that one method of coverage would be more powerful
than the other in shaping how individuals perceive their elected officials. As such,
I allow for any mention of a senator to be counted as news worthy of examination
for game or governing language. I also set parameters to capture use of a formal
title (i.e. “Senator Shelby”) or a full name (i.e. “Richard Shelby”). In cases where
politicians could possibly go by multiple names (i.e. “Charles Schumer” is sometimes
called “Chuck Schumer”), the search accounts for both possibilities. These broad
parameters allow me to gather every mention of a senator across the time period
under examination.
As discussed earlier, local media coverage is not the only type of coverage that
might affect how citizens of a state perceive of the job a senator is doing. National
media coverage can thrust a senator into the spotlight, adding a second layer of media
dynamics that senators must either embrace or avoid. A senator being discussed
by what we might consider national media sources for his or her contributions to
promoting issues or getting work accomplished in Washington might be exalted by
locals within his constituency for being a major player on the political stage. On the
other hand, a senator who, through ties to media coverage of political infighting or
political compromising, is seen as part of the problem Americans have with Congress
in general, might suffer from his or her connection to this nationalized narrative. As
such, taking a look at a senator’s connection (if any) to the national media’s framing
of congressional politics is an essential counterpart to the examination of the effects of
local press. I include, therefore, a monthly count of mentions of the senators being
examined in Washington Post articles from January 2006 to November/December
2006. Such analysis will offer insight into how senators are bound to the national
narrative that is often picked up on by other popular media outlets (such as television
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and the Associated Press) and whether being bound to that narrative drives how
constituents perceive them.
Media coverage is potentially a major force in determining which senators
receive high approval ratings from their constituents and which senators receive low
approval ratings, but it is not the only potential force at play here. We might
want to consider alternative explanations based on Fenno’s concept of “hill style”
(Fenno 1978). Hill style is an expression of the type of senator each senator is while
working in Washington. It is captured by such factors as legislative productivity and
connections to key power brokers within the House and Senate. It is true that some of
the work of cultivating and employing a hill style for each senator is work performed
by the media; after all, a senator can hardly be expected to directly connect with
one percent of his constituents, let alone the bulk of those he or she represents.
However, the path for direct connection with constituents, unfiltered by the media,
remains a possibility that must be accounted for at some level. To get at capturing
the possibility that hill style can directly shape opinion, I suggest two variables:
one capturing the number of bills a senator proposed per month (a signal of their
legislative productivity and, as such, perhaps a signal that a legislator is working or
not working), and one capturing party affiliation (accounting for positive or negative
associations that might exist at the time with either political party). Ideally, these
variables capture the possibility that citizens can pick up on information directly
emanating from Washington-based activity.
It is also essential to realize that current opinion is more than likely a function
of all of the variables discussed here plus opinions of the past (which, as modeled,
express the significance of previous levels of the independent variables within this
model). Therefore, the model will also include a variable capturing past levels of
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approval as well.
Methods
It is important that we keep in mind what our data look like: we are examining
the approval of eighty-six senators. For some of these senators, we capture approval
for a period of ten months, while for others, we have eleven months to work with.
To put this data in commonly used methodological terms, we have 86 cross-sectional
units that we are studying over time. In other words, we have what one could
call panel data. There are clear advantages to this statistical approach to looking
at data (Baltagi 1995, Gujarati (2003). Panel data benefit the inquiry by taking
heterogeneity in the units being analyzed into account. Panel data grant us leeway
in terms of degrees of freedom. Panel data allow for examining effects that cannot
be detected by limiting oneself to either cross-sectional or time-series data alone.
Perhaps most importantly, panel data allow us to study the “dynamics of change”
(Gujarati 2003, p.638).
However, as Stimson (1985) suggests, examining data across multiple units
and multiple data points is a double edged sword in some ways. Stimson notes
the positives other scholars have expressed, but also delivers a warning to those
undertaking this type of statistical modeling in stating that “regressions on data
jointly structured in space and time...can be formidable both in the strength of their
design properties and in the number of special statistical problems encountered with
them” (Stimson 1985, p.914) In essence, it is crucial that we heed the warnings of
scholars who have studied data like the data being studied here (also commonly
referred to as time-series cross-section data) and select an appropriate model to best
harness the potential explanatory power for the phenomenon under examination.
One place to start in selecting an appropriate model is with Stimson’s (1985,
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p. 929) look at regression in space and time. Stimson suggests that if one’s N
is greater than one’s T (what he calls cross-sectional dominance), there are three
potential options: ordinary least squares, fixed effects, or random effects. Beck and
Katz (1995), however, point out some major issues with the concept of using ordinary
least squares with time-series cross-sectional data, namely that “most analysts...are
not willing to accept the assumption of spherical errors” (p.636); in essence, they
claim that if we use ordinary least squares, we may not be certain that our standard
errors are accurate. More specifically, they note the potential that large errors for
one unit may be correlated with large errors for another unit at the same time, that
variances of errors could possibly differ from one unit to the next (what they call
“panel heteroscedasticity,” and that errors might depend on time. Beck and Katz
claim that other potential modeling choices “make more efficient use of the data”
(p.636).
A potential solution to these questions is to use the fixed effects approach sug-
gested by Stimson. As Gujarati (2003, p.642) notes, fixed effects allow one to “take
into account the individuality of each...cross-sectional unit” through letting the in-
tercept vary but assuming that slope coefficients are constant. We must determine,
however, that the fixed effects approach is appropriate instead of the random effects
approach. Gujarati suggests that one reason one might choose a fixed effects ap-
proach instead of a random effects approach is if one believes that the units being
studied are “not random drawings from a larger sample” (p.650); in that we are not
randomly drawing senators from the universe of senators, we might consider adhering
to this suggestion. To more formally make this decision though, we run a Hausman
test to determine if fixed effects are needed to eliminate bias. Hausman tests run
on the data in this chapter reveal the need for fixed effects; we are unable to reject
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the null hypothesis that intercepts are uncorrelated with the regressors. As such, we
proceed with a fixed effects approach to dealing with our panel data.
Findings
We begin our inquiry into senatorial approval by taking a look at the ma-
jor variable under examination: senatorial approval, game coverage, and governing
coverage. Table 3 lists the descriptive statistics for these three variables.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Senators
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Senatorial Approval 55.01 7.99 79 34
Governing References 183.02 153.57 0 1643
Game References 70.94 59.80 0 483
Number of observations 889
The average senator receives fifty-five percent approval from his or her con-
stituents. In other words, senatorial approval is only slightly more than a majority
of one’s state. Given the low approval Congress typically receives (throughout 2006,
approval was typically in the twenties or thirties), the average senator should at
least be comforted by the clear separation between their approval and approval of
the institution in which they serve. The senator achieving the highest approval in
the model was Senator Olympia Snowe of Maine, who received positive approval on
the part of 79 percent of her constituents in November of 2006 (her tenth consecutive
month with approval above 70 percent). On the other hand, the senator achieving
the model’s minimum level of approval was Senator Mike DeWine of Ohio, whose
performance was approved of by only 34 percent of citizens in November of 2006. It
should be no surprise that this level of approval came in the wake of his defeat (to
Representative Sherrod Brown) in a quest for a third term.
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When it comes to game coverage in their state’s most highly circulated news-
papers, senators are associated with, on average, 70 game references per month. The
senator who received the most game references in a single month was Senator Bill
Frist of Tennessee, who saw 483 game references used in coverage of him in July
of 2006 in the Chattanooga Times Free Press. Frist’s game coverage being at this
high level is not entirely surprising, given his leadership position within the Sen-
ate (and therefore his regular activity in negotiating with or sparring with political
opponents). Four senators experienced months during which coverage of them was
associated with no game coverage at all; these senators were Senator Mike Crapo of
Idaho (who had game free coverage in May and July), Senators Sam Brownback and
Pat Roberts of Kansas (who received no game coverage in March), and Senator Jim
DeMint of South Carolina (with a November free of game framing). On the other
hand, when it comes to governing coverage in their state’s most highly circulated
newspapers, senators are associated with, on average, 183 governing references per
month. The senator who received the most governing coverage in a single month was
also Senator Frist of Tennessee, who saw 1643 governing references used in coverage
of him in July 2006. Only three senators had months without any governing cover-
age whatsoever; once again, these were Senators Sam Brownback and Pat Roberts
of Kansas, who received no governing coverage in March, and Senator Jim DeMint
of South Carolina, who received no governing coverage in November. These three
senators receiving no game or governing coverage in these specific months should be
no surprise, given that these are the only three instances in the model in which sena-
tors are left uncovered by highly circulated newspapers (the Topeka Capital Journal
and the Charleston Post and Courier respectively) in their states.
It is also interesting to note that senators receive, on average, just over two and
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half times more governing coverage than they do game coverage per month in highly
circulated newspapers in their home states. This should be reassuring to senators
who are focused on not only advertising what they are doing and what they stand
for, but also attempting to control the coverage that ends up in front of the eyes of
those who will, at some point down the road, head to the polling place and decide
their fate. In general, media coverage appears to have the potential to do more
good than harm. What we will now see is whether or not there is more than face
value benefit to the volume of coverages that exist. Having examined the key data
within the model, we now move to our first model, a look at game and governing
frames potentially affect senatorial approval. In addition, we look at the possibility
that competing explanations (bill authorship, volume of national coverage, party
affiliation, and previous approval) drive monthly approval of senators. Table 4 tests
the validity of the first three hypotheses discussed previously, revealing the findings
of the first fixed effects model executed.23.
When it comes to the link between governing framing, game framing, and
senatorial approval, we see a mixed bag of findings. Governing coverage plays no
role in separating those with high levels of monthly job approval from those with
low levels of approval. The coefficient is positive (as we would expect), but not
statistically significant. Hypothesis 1 is found to be invalid. On the other hand,
game coverage is significantly linked to monthly job approval. Senators with higher
levels of game coverage have lower levels of approval from their constituents. For
every one additional game reference in local newspapers, we see a decline in approval
of one one-hundredth of a percent. At face value, this effect is incredibly small, but
23Other variables capturing state partisanship, upcoming re-election battles, presidential aspi-
rations, senatorial partisanship, and senatorial polarization were included in models; however, the
model drops these variables
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Table 4: Explaining Monthly Senatorial Approval
Predictors Effect On Approval
Senatorial Approvalt−1 .154* (.036)
Game Framing -.006* (.004)
Governing Framing .002 (.001)
National Coverage -.004 (.016)
Bills Authored -.044* (.022)
Party Affiliation 1.676 (2.865)
Constant 45.882* (2.516)
Number of observations 889
Number of groups 86
Note: Fixed effects model.
Data are monthly, 2006:1 to 2006:11 or 2006:12 depending on the senator.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* = p < 0.05, one-tailed tests.
we know that the average senator receives 70 game references per month (and thanks
to Table 3 that the standard deviation when it comes to game references is just under
60). A one standard deviation increase in game references would bring about a drop
in approval of about six tenths of a percent. Hypothesis 2 is validated by this model.
We should not be surprised by the statistical link between game coverage and
low approval. As Fenno (1975) discusses, individual members, for the most part,
have a good deal of built in good will with their constituents. Moreover, members of
Congress are highly focused on trying to ensure that said good will remains high or
increases over time. Game coverage runs counter to those efforts. It paints members
of Congress as caught up in partisan politics and in the infighting that exists in the
Senate. It is a sign that a senator has caught in a snare that he or she has been
desperately trying to avoid.
The findings in Table 4 also help us answer several other questions as to what
separates senators with high levels of approval from senators with intermediate or
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low approval. National news coverage is not a variable that helps us explain approval.
In Hypothesis 3, we argued that those senators caught up in the Washington news
cycle might be seen as creatures of Washington or as more focused on national
politics and less focused on what was good for the state being represented. This
does not appear to be the case. Interestingly though, there is a significant link
between bill authorship and approval, but this link is not in the direction that would
be expected. For every additional bill authored, a senator’s approval declines by
about four hundredths of a percent. We would think that bill authorship would be
a tangible symbol of accomplishment, but in that writing a bill is not the same as
voting for a bill or specifically delivering a project to a district, perhaps it is not seen
as getting something done. Political party affiliation (included to capture potential
differences that might exist given political situations in the year under examination)
is not a predictor of high or low approval either. Being a Democrat does not lead
to more reward or disfavor than being a Republican, even in a year during which
many Republicans generally fell out of favor with the general public. Unsurprisingly,
we also find a strong relationship between the previous month’s approval and the
current month’s approval as well.
Having shown that one form of framing (specifically game framing) plays a
role in separating senators with high levels of approval from senators with low levels
of approval, we now move to answering the question of how media framing in local
newspaper coverage might shape movement of approval from one month to the next
(in other words, the change in approval that each senator undergoes). In addition to
looking at the role game and governing framing plays in driving change in approval,
we also look at the role competing explanations play; as with the previous model,
competing explanations here include volume of national coverage, bill authorship,
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and party affiliation). Table 5 tests the validity of the fourth and fifth hypotheses
discussed previously, revealing the findings of the second fixed effects model executed.
Table 5: Explaining Change in Monthly Senatorial Approval
Predictors Effect On Approval
Game Framing -.004 (.005)
Governing Framing .003* (.002)
National Coverage .008 (.021)
Bills Authored -.037 (.029)
Party Affiliation .306 (3.735)
Constant -.472 (2.068)
Number of observations 889
Number of groups 86
Note: Fixed effects model.
Data are monthly, 2006:1 to 2006:11 or 2006:12 depending on the senator.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* = p < 0.05, one-tailed tests.
Here we find the opposite of the model looking strictly at senatorial approval.
Whereas game framing separates senators with high levels of approval from senators
with low levels approval, change in approval from one month to the next can be
explained by levels of governing coverage. A one unit increase in governing coverage
drives improvement in senatorial approval from one month to the next of about three
thousandths of a percent. This is a small number to be sure, but keep in mind that
the average senator receives approximately 183 governing references per month (with
a standard deviation of 154). A one standard deviation increase in governing framing
would drive an improvement of about one-half percentage point in approval from one
month to the next. So, governing framing significantly shapes change in approval
from one month to the next. It may not guarantee high approval (as was displayed
by the first model), but it can bring about short term movement in approval in
positive fashion. Getting involved with issues and with the business of legislating
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might therefore be a prescription senators should heed if looking to bring about a
bit of change in the perceptions of those they represent. These findings perhaps
represent an accomplishment bump of sorts.
While Hypothesis 4 (governing framing’s effect on change in approval from
previous month to current month) is validated by this latest model, Hypothesis 5
(seeking a link between game framing and change in approval from last month to
current month) is not found credible. Game framing separated senators with high
approval from senators with low approval, but it is not found to drive month to
month shifts in public favor. At the same time, competing explanations for monthly
shifts in approval are also found to be insignificant. National news coverage does not
matter, nor does bill authorship or political party affiliation.
Implications
Once again, in this chapter, we discover that media framing plays a role in
shaping approval. Senatorial approval in general is driven by game framing. Higher
levels of game framing showing up in a senator’s local media coverage is associated
with a lower level of monthly job approval. Changes in senatorial approval from the
previous month to the current month, on the other hand, are driven by governing
framing. Higher levels of association in local media coverage with issues and the
business of legislating are shown here to lead to positive movement in approval from
one month to the next. Framing matters when it comes to senatorial approval, but
as shown here, different frames matter in different ways.
Senators can learn lessons from the findings here, lessons that might shape
the relationship they develop with the local media. Being associated with issues and
legislative business may not guarantee a high level of approval, but it can cause short
term positive movement in public sentiment. Those suffering from low approval and
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seeking to turn the public in their favor, even slightly, might be advised to focus
on issues and the nuts and bolts of the legislative process. Senators who already
have high levels of approval should recognize that their lack of association with the
elements of the game is a factor that has propelled them to the heights they have
achieved. Continued focus on governing can only go a long way toward ensuring they
stay at the level of favor they have achieved.
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CHAPTER V
MEDIA FRAMING AND THE INDIVIDUAL
As shown so far, game and governing framing help answer questions about
approval of Congress and its members in a macro sense, both over time and cross-
sectionally. What we have yet to answer is how game and governing affect the
individual, and how they stack up against other demographic and political predictors
in determining who will approve or disapprove of Congress and who will approve
and disapprove of the individuals sent to Washington. Through an original survey
experiment, here we begin to answer those questions. At the micro level, we find
that media framing shapes how individuals feel about Congress and, to some extent,
how they feel about certain legislators.
The questions driving our examination so far have been, at face value, questions
mostly answered by scholars and pundits alike through macro-level analysis. When
we attempt to evaluate the job Congress is doing, often times we rely solely on (or,
to put it another way, take as shorthand) a look at the percentage of people who
approve of Congress and the percentage of people who disapprove. When we attempt
to evaluate the job that a specific senator or representative is doing, we often use the
same strategy of focusing on the aggregate number. The questions Richard Fenno
asked over thirty years ago, however, are not solely questions that lend themselves to
macro-level explanations. They are questions that deserve individual-level answers.
When Fenno asks why we hate our Congress, he is not just asking about
why Congress’s levels of approval are consistently low. He is also asking about
what individual Americans see when they look at the legislative branch, and at
the same time where this vision of Congress as troublesome or problematic comes
from. Similarly, Fenno’s question about why we love the members of Congress that
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represent us is a question that points to the unique relationships citizens build with
the individuals they send to Washington. The answers to these questions may lie in
who we are, what we are taught, or in the types of information we expose ourselves
to on a daily basis.
Existing Explanations
Examining the individual level determinants of support for Congress and its
members has taken two related paths over the past several decades. One path ex-
amines how demographics and political factors shape our assessments of individual
players in the legislative branch, as well as the branch itself. The other path looks at
different ways in which information might matter. For the most part, these inquiries
have focused solely on Congress (with a handful of detours into what drives approval
of other major political players) and have ignored how individuals feel about their
own representative or senator. We will attempt, therefore, a discussion of the lit-
erature surrounding this question of what shapes how we feel about Congress and
use the findings to better understand what might and might not drive feelings about
those we send to Washington.
The earliest individual level investigations into what shapes support for Congress
began with the types of variables that often begin any inquiry into public opinion in
a political context, namely demographics, measures of participation, and measures
of ideological leanings. Over thirty-five years ago, Davidson and Parker (1972), in
an attempt to take a state-level inquiry performed several years earlier by Boyn-
ton, Patterson, and Hedlund (1968) national, examined correlates of public support
of Congress. They discovered that demographic factors like occupation, income,
age, and education did a poor job of predicting positive support for the institu-
tion. Davidson and Parker had better luck finding links between explicitly political
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variables like partisanship, political participation, political efficacy, and campaign in-
terest and support for Congress. The work of Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan (1992)
two decades later concurs with earlier attempts; no links between demographics and
support are found, while variables like political efficacy and party identification do
shape how individuals feel about the job Congress is doing.
At the same time these demographic and political inquiries were taking place,
so too were a handful of investigations into the tight linkages between approval levels
of various facets of the legislative branch. As Born (1990) points out, members of
Congress may attempt to separate themselves from the institution, but often times
there is an inescapable shared fate between the two. Patterson, Ripley, and Quin-
lan (1992), in their discussion of the multifaceted nature of congressional approval,
expand on how this might shape opinions, namely that individuals might transfer
their feelings about individual members that represent them to the institution as a
whole. These beliefs are borne out in some of the links they examine between legis-
lator approval and legislative branch approval, finding that feelings about senators
were significantly linked to feelings about Congress. Work by Kimball and Patter-
son (1997) reinforces this relationship between support for specific individuals in the
legislative branch and support for the branch as a whole.
Game, Governing, and Individual Approval
Over time, however, discussions of approval of Congress at the individual level
have often times become discussions about information, specifically what types of
knowledge might drive American opinion expression. Scholars undertaking the de-
bate over what factors might separate those who support the job Congress is doing
from those who oppose it enter this arena keeping a few truths in mind; these truths
are, as Mondak et al. (2007, p. 34) put it, that “Americans seem to know little
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about the dominant players in Congress, how Congress operates, and the legislation
Congress produces.” Links between knowledge and approval of Congress and its
members have been analyzed by several groups of scholars. These scholars tend to
conclude that knowledge does have the power to shape our assessments (and specif-
ically, in this case, to stir, as Patterson and Kimball (1997, p. 716) put it, “strong
feelings” about the legislative branch. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) find that
greater knowledge about Congress is associated with more critical evaluations of
Congress and its members. Mondak et al. (2007) use a battery of political knowl-
edge questions about procedures, politics, and policies (akin to those focused on by
Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996)) to present an even more nuanced picture of a rela-
tionship between knowledge and approval, showing that those with higher amounts
of knowledge dislike Congress, but also that uninformed individuals use a handful of
other criteria in assessing the legislative branch.
Critiques of this approach of conflating knowledge with correct or incorrect
answers to civics questions exist however (for example, Graber (2001), who argues
that measurements of political information should be more focused on what people
need to know that on history and events), and they suggest we take a more multi-
faceted approach to what possessing useful political knowledge and information truly
means. We can do this in several ways. One is to rely on other measures of expo-
sure to politics (and argue that exposure to politics builds in individuals stores of
practical information on how government works, if government is working, and how
they can play a role in making government work). This can be accomplished through
reintroducing several variables into the equation explaining approval of Congress and
its members that have been left out by recent scholars, namely variables that capture
participatory measures like voting and proximity to politics measures like political
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interest. Exposure to information about government can also be captured through
specific media measures gauging the use of televised and print media specifically
related to hard news. Once again, the game and governing frames as discussed in
detail in Chapter II are two such measures that might prove fruitful for examination.
Along the lines of relationships argued for and tested in previously presented
examinations of the relationship between game, governing, and approval of Congress
and its members (i.e. Chapter III and Chapter IV), I will examine the validity of
the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Exposure to game language about Congress will lead
to negative job approval of Congress.
Hypothesis 2: Exposure to governing language about Congress will
lead to positive job approval of Congress.
Similarly to the macro-level examinations of Congress in Chapter III, here
at the individual level I argue that exposure to game language will drive negative
assessments of Congress, while exposure to governing language will drive positive
assessments of Congress. We should expect individuals exposed to new game in-
formation to feel that it reinforces previously held information about the woes of
Congress, while exposure to new governing information should move individuals off
such disparaging views and toward a more positive view on the legislative branch.
Hypothesis 3: Exposure to game language about one’s senators will
lead to negative job approval of one’s senators.
Hypothesis 4: Exposure to governing language about one’s senators
will lead to positive job approval of one’s senators.
Similarly to the macro-level examinations of the Senate in Chapter IV, here
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at the individual level I argue that exposure to game language will drive negative
assessments of one’s senatorial delegation, while exposure to governing language will
drive positive assessments of one’s senatorial delegation.24 Governing language on
senators should reinforce generally held existing positivity towards legislators sent to
Washington, while exposure to game language should erode said positivity.
Hypothesis 5: Exposure to game language about one’s representative
will lead to negative job approval of one’s representative.
Hypothesis 6: Exposure to governing language about one’s repre-
sentative will lead to positive job approval of one’s representative.
To date, this study has yet to look at the relationships between game, govern-
ing, and approval of the individual member of the House of Representatives. Coming
into this inquiry, I have no opinion as to why individuals would react differently here
than they would when it comes to their approach to assessing their senators. If
anything, we might expect individuals, when asked to assess their representative, to
come to the table with less existing information and attitudes than they would when
asked about their senators, given the fact that senators work in a brighter spotlight
than members of the House. This might lead us to expect game and governing cover-
age to play a stronger role in opinion formation about representatives in comparison
to senators.
Measuring Framing and Individual Approval
To test the potential linkages between game coverage, governing coverage, and
24Due to the nature of the experimental design utilized (and the nature of the pool of subjects
from which I am drawing), I am asking survey questions about senatorial job approval in the
broadest sense possible, one in which I do not use specific names of senators but rather simply ask
about the performance of one’s senators in total. This is not an ideal situation, but I argue it is
the most appropriate given my inability to pre-verify the residency of each and every person within
my subject pool.
104
individual opinions of the performance of Congress, Senators, and representatives, an
experiment was conducted on over 500 students in introductory-level political science
courses at Texas A&M University in the Spring of 2008.25 Students were told they
were participating in a survey intended to gauge reactions to the legislative branch
and its members. After listening to a description of how to participate, students were
given a packet of information. The process of delivering treatments to individuals
taking part in the survey was entirely random, and the randomizing of the treatment
packets was performed by simply shuffling the packets and distributing them as
subjects took their seats in a classroom. 457 students took part in the experiment.
Initial efforts were made to ensure an approximate ratio of six packets with framing
information for every one control packet; 75 of each of the six framing treatments
were entered into the packet shuffling process, along with 25 of each of the control
treatments).
The packet included an information sheet about the project. This information
sheet described the purpose of the study (to determine if and how media portrayals
of legislative situations relate to opinion), what students would be asked to do (an-
swer demographic and political questions and read a short story about legislating),
the risks involved (minimal, but not greater than those encountered in daily life),
and the benefits of participating (no direct benefits other than adding to a greater
understanding of political phenomena). Subjects then filled out a short demographic
questionnaire that asked them about gender, race, political interest, party identifi-
cation, political beliefs, media consumption (newspaper news reading and television
news viewing), and recent voting behavior.26
25Although, as Peterson (2001) suggests, college student populations might be slightly more
homogenous than general populations, there are no specific expectations in this context that such
differences in homogeneity will bias the outcome in a specific fashion or direction. As such, I feel
comfortable with the chosen population under examination.
26The specific questions asked can be found in Appendix Two; question wording was drawn from
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Receiving the packet of information allowed the experiment to place students
randomly into one of nine treatment groups. Differences in treatments were based on
the media story the individual subjects read following completion of the demographic
questionnaire. Media stories dealt with one of three topics: Congress, a senator, or a
representative. Based on the wording of the stories, subjects were led to believe that
the stories dealt with their representation in Washington; however, specific names of
senators and representatives were not used in the media stories (instead, the stories
utilize phrasing like “the senator” and “the representative” to avoid potential con-
fusion). Media stories dealt with one of three reporting styles as well: a style geared
toward game framing language, a style geared toward governing framing language,
and a style that used neither of these frames and served as a control. With differences
across story topics and reporting styles, nine distinct groups of subjects were created.
For our purposes here, we will label them as follows: Congress-Game, Congress-
Governing, Congress-Control, Senator-Game, Senator-Governing, Senator-Control,
Representative-Game, Representative-Congress, and Representative-Control.
Each media story began with a headline that set up the reporting style at play
throughout the story. For example, stories discussing Congress and using game fram-
ing language began with the headline “Congress Closes Session With Economic Bill;
Both Sides Continue To Quarrel.” Game framing stories dealing with the senator
or the representative merely switched the first word of the headline. This headline
phrasing, in using the word “quarrel,” sends an immediate game frame signal to
the reader. Stories dealing with Congress and using governing framing language
began with the headline “Congress Closes Session With Economic Bill; Both Sides
Debate, Work To Schedule Votes.” Similar headlines with first-word variations were
wording commonly used in other surveys such as the American National Election Study.
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used for governing stories dealing with senators and representatives. This headline
phrasing, in using the words “debate,” “work,” and “vote,” sends an immediate gov-
erning frame signal to the reader. Stories given to control groups utilized truncated
versions of these headlines; for example, the control group receiving a story about
Congress only saw a headline that read “Congress Closes Session With Economic
Bill.” Each media story, regardless of reporting style or story topic, then contained a
lead common lead paragraph that laid out the justification for why the media would
be covering the event at hand; in the case of the control groups with no reporting
style, this lead paragraph was the only item the subject read. This lead paragraph
discusses how, on the day of a congressional recess, the story topic (be that Congress,
the Senator, or the Representative) dealt with some last minute economic issues.
After the common lead paragraph, the stories the subjects in the game and
governing framing categories read progress in markedly different fashions. Those
reading a story in which the media use game framing to discuss congressional, sena-
torial, or representative activity hear that the session was filled with “disagreements,
obstruction, and attempts to impede the legislative process.” They hear about how
there are hopes to end bickering but there is also a lack of willingness to step forward
and bring opposition groups together. They hear about quarrels and failed negoti-
ations. They hear about retaliation and skirmishes that could have been avoided
but continue to flare up. They hear about battles, divisions, and a lack of winners
throughout the political process. On the other hand, those reading a story that ties
governing language to Congress, a Senator, or a Representative hears a completely
different picture of the action that has just taken place. These individuals read about
“key votes” that have taken place. They read about bills and votes scheduled for the
future, and about the committee and subcommittee work planned to take place once
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Congress returns. They also read about a bevy of other issues that the subject of the
story will be involved in in the near future, such as the environment, immigration,
education, and the federal budget. In short, whereas those in the game framed sto-
ries hear about the push and pull between fighting and compromise (which pushes
more toward the fighting end of the spectrum), those in the governing framed stories
hear about the actual work being performed and the issues that have been and will
be dealt with.
After reading their media story, subjects were asked to answer a series of ques-
tions about Congress, their United States Senators, and their United States Repre-
sentative.27 Subjects were asked if they strongly approved, approved, disapproved,
or strongly disapproved of the job Congress is doing, if they trusted in the legislative
branch a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or not at all, and if they had a great
deal of confidence in Congress, a fair amount, only a little, or none at all. Subjects
were then asked similar job approval, trust, and confidence questions about Senators
and their Representative.28 Subjects, in all cases, were also given the opportunity
to respond that they had no opinion or were not sure. These questions, in total,
allow me to examine the potential effects of media framing (and other competing
explanations) on a variety of specific and distinct ways of evaluating legislators and
the legislative branch. Our focus here will be on three of these measures: approval
of Congress, approval of one’s senators, and approval of one’s representative.
My intent is to see how media framing affects measures of approval in legis-
lators and the legislative branch. While determinants of congressional, senatorial,
and representative approval have been examined in terms of individual-level survey
27The specific questions asked can be found in Appendix Two.
28The wording of the questions asked was taken from existing questions available via IPoll, the
Roper Center’s online survey question database at http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.
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responses (as discussed earlier), none of these measures mentioned above have been
probed by scholars in the context of the potential effects of the mass media. Each
of these measures mentioned above is measured with a range of responses from low
(strongly disapprove) to high (strongly approve), offering several distinct categories
from which individual subjects can choose.29
The key independent variables of interest in each of the models will be the
type of media coverage received. Individuals either received game framing, governing
framing, or no framing whatsoever (i.e. control group). All models include variables
capturing the presence or absence of game coverage and governing coverage in the
media story read by the individual; this creates two dichotomous media framing
variables. These variables will allow us to determine if game coverage has negative
and significant effects and if governing coverage has positive and significant effects in
each context. Efforts were made to ensure that similar numbers of subjects received
the framed treatments (and also that similar numbers of subjects received the control
group treatments). A breakdown of these efforts can be found in Table 6.
Table 6: Treatment Categories of Participants
Treatment Type Number Percent
Game Coverage/Congress 62 13.6
Governing Coverage/Congress 62 13.6
Game Coverage/Senator 67 14.7
Governing Coverage/Senator 63 13.8
Game Coverage/Representative 74 16.2
Governing Coverage/Representative 69 15.1
Control/Congress 21 4.6
Control/Senator 20 4.4
Control/Representative 19 4.2
N 457
29Specific questions and response categories can be found in Appendix Two.
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As Table 6 reveals, there is an approximately six and one-half to one ratio
between treatments with framed media information and control packets (397 framed
packets were read by subjects, with 60 control individuals). Just over forty-four per-
cent of subjects read articles with game frame information, while just over forty-two
percent read articles with governing frame information. Relatively similar numbers
of individuals surveyed read responses dealing with Congress, a senator, or a repre-
sentative (31.7 percent, 32.8 percent, and 35.4 percent respectively). In short, the
number of respondents in each framing treatment is relatively well balanced, as is
the number of subjects in each control treatment.
In each model, I utilize two media attention variables: one that captures tele-
vision news viewing and one that captures newspaper news reading. Despite the
findings of Davidson and Parker (1972) linking media awareness to congressional
support, many scholars seem to leave media coverage variables out of their model
for unknown reasons. Including these two measures of individual-level relationships
to informative media will allow me to paint a broader picture of how tuned in in-
dividuals are to reporting about political phenomena; it will also offer insight into
how the politically informed differ from the politically uninformed, if at all. The
wording of these variables (in that they ask about television news coverage and not
just television viewing, as well as newspaper news reading and not just newspaper
reading) offer added leverage over commonly asked media questions, which often
capture media usage wholly unrelated to an individual’s learning about the politi-
cal world around them. In addition, these variables should serve as proxies for the
amount of political information each individual has; as Mondak et al. (2007) have
shown, political information can shape how citizens view the legislative branch.30 We
30Media variables are not perfect proxies for the type of political information Mondak and his
co-authors examine, which is a battery of fourteen general political knowledge questions. However,
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should expect individuals who read news sections of the newspaper or watch news
programming on television to have more political information to use in evaluating
government than those individuals who consume little to no news via print or tele-
vised sources. Both variables range from zero days a week of news media exposure
to daily exposure to print and televised news.
Along with the media framing and media attentiveness variables in each model,
I also seek to capture several other competing explanations for congressional, sena-
torial, and representative approval. These competing explanations have been chosen
based on the efforts of other scholars who have previously undertaken similar efforts.
These competing explanations, in many ways, boil down to two distinct categories:
political factors and demographic factors.
First, in addition to the main media-related independent variables of interest,
each model will control for the effects of similarly worded dependent variables that
tap sentiment about other political actors. As Patterson, Ripley, and Quigley (1992),
Kimball and Patterson (1997), and Mondak et al. (2007) show, approval of individual
legislators has the potential to shape approval of the legislative branch. I employ
this philosophy in each of my models. For example, in a model looking at approval of
Congress, I include each subject’s responses to the approval questions on his or her
senator and representative. I also seek to determine if the opposite relationship exists;
there is potential that one’s opinions of one’s senators and representatives might be
driven by one’s opinions of Congress. This also means that in the senatorial and
representative approval models, I include the congressional approval measure.
Following in the footsteps of those who have previously modeled congressional
media attentiveness along with political interest measurements should capture a broader sense of
individual political awareness, which is similar to what is tapped by Mondak.
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approval at the individual level, I also include variables capturing connections to po-
litical phenomena in my models; these variables, despite being only tested in models
looking at Congress, will also be placed into the models looking at senatorial approval
and representative approval. The first of these variables is party identification, which
ranges from Strong Democrat to Strong Republican (and offers in-between categories
allowing individuals to label themselves not-so-strong party affiliated or as being un-
sure or having no opinion about the question). The second of these variables captures
political sentiment removed from party labels. It measures Political Ideology, and it
ranges from highly liberal to highly conservative. Like with the party identification
variable, it offers less rigid classifications (in this case “slightly” liberal or conserva-
tive), as well as a category for non-identifiers and those who are unsure. I offer a
variable that captures a general interest in politics. It assesses the individual’s belief
that he or she is interested in politics, offering response possibilities from highly in-
terested to highly disinterested (along with intermediate categories similar to those
discussed earlier).31 Separate from the political interest variable, I also include a
variable that captures political activity/participation. This is the simplest of the
political variables, in that it merely asks if the individual did or did not vote in
the primary election held approximately six weeks before the survey experiment was
performed.32 These political variables, in total, will allow us to determine if parties,
ideology, interest, and involvement matter not only at the congressional level (where
findings have been mixed), but also at the level of the senator and representative
31Despite the fact that these students are in political science classes, we should not necessarily
believe that they are predisposed to being interested in politics more so than a general population;
this is because taking such introductory political science courses is mandatory in the state of Texas
and as such, the population should be a mix of people enthused to learn about government and
people who have to be there to fulfill a degree requirement.
32The fact that this variable captures political activity through primary voting might will natu-
rally make it stricter than a variable that captured general election voting; however, it should be
remembered that the primary in question, held in March 2008, was a highly contentious one at the
presidential level.
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(where findings are nonexistent).
All of the three models also include standard controls for race (offering African
American, Asian American, Caucasian, and Latino options) and gender (offering
male and female options). Since the population of the survey experiment is limited
to college age students, variables capturing other status measures (for example, age
and education) are moot. Said students are all at nearly equivalent levels of education
(give or take a few years). Students are also all nearly similar in age (give or take a
few years). Given the nature of the pool of subjects, I also do not include variables
that capture differences in income; such a question would either reveal that students
are, for the most part, in similar economic states (since they are presumably studying
and taking classes and not working full time), or would try to get at the economic
status of families (which would be a different question altogether). As such, I leave
such questions out of my analysis entirely to ward off problems of interpretation.
Methods
Having answered the question of what variables are most appropriate when it
comes to modeling congressional, senatorial, and representative approval, the next
question presents itself: what model is most appropriate? This is an especially
important question given the categorical nature of our dependent variable. Long
and Freese (2006) note that, in the case of models analyzing variables that range
from strongly agree to strongly disagree, many who study said variables would not
automatically assume that the distance from strongly agree to agree is the same
as the distance from agree to disagree. This fact means that we have to treat our
approval variables differently. An ordinal regression model fits the bill.
The ordinal regression model, as Long and Freese (2006, p. 183) describe it, is
a nonlinear model where “the magnitude of the change in the outcome probability
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for a given change in one of the independent variables depends on the levels of all the
independent variables.” This means that, while sign and significance of coefficients
is directly interpretable, impact may not be so easily understood. As such, following
each ordinal regression model (in this case, ordered logit models of congressional
approval, senatorial approval, and representative approval), I will discuss key findings
in terms of marginal changes that exist.
Findings
Before getting to the potential relationships that exist between game framing,
governing framing, and congressional, senatorial, and representative approval, it is
important that we dig deeper into the pool of subjects undertaking the experimental
process, so that we have a better idea of the individuals we are dealing with (and so
we can see how typical or atypical a set of individuals we might have). Table 7 lays
out demographic and media attentiveness findings from our set of subjects.
A look at the demographics of our pool of subjects reveals a set of individuals
that is slightly more male than female (54 percent to 46 percent) and fairly heavily
caucasian in terms of racial category (over three quarters of individuals taking part).
Latinos make up just under ten percent of the population of subjects, while Asian
Americans make up just under seven percent and African Americans make up three
and one-half percent.
In terms of media attentiveness and usage, the findings present a somewhat
bleak picture as to how aware citizens might be of what is taking place when it
comes to the news. Almost seventy percent of subjects read the news portion of a
newspaper somewhere between zero and two days per week. Only just over twelve
percent of subjects were what we might call regular readers of news sections, in
that they use them between five and seven days per week. When it comes to using
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Table 7: Demographic Characteristics and Media Usage of Participants
Variable Percent
Sex
Male 54.0
Female 46.0
Race/Ethnicity
Caucasian 76.1
Latino 9.6
Asian American 6.8
Other 3.9
African American 3.5
Newspaper News Usage
Zero Days A Week 33.7
One To Two Days 36.1
Three To Four Days 17.7
Five To Six Days 6.1
Every Day 6.3
Television News Usage
Zero Days A Week 23.7
One To Two Days 39.7
Three To Four Days 21.3
Five To Six Days 6.1
Every Day 9.2
N 457
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the televised media for news coverage, the results are slightly more positive. Only
approximately sixty-three percent of subjects fall into the zero or one to two days per
week categories. Over fifteen percent of individuals surveyed utilized the television
for news programming five, six, or seven days each week.
In addition to demographic and media usage variables, the survey also mea-
sured four variables that captured each subject’s involvement in the political process.
These variables include the subject’s political views, party identification, level of po-
litical interest, and recent voting history. Table 8 lays out the distribution of these
political variables in the pool of experimental subjects.
Table 8: Political Characteristics of Participants
Variable Percent
Political Interest
Highly Interested 13.8
Interested 51.4
Unsure 14.1
Disinterested 16.5
Highly Disinterested 4.2
Political Ideology
Highly Liberal 5.3
Slightly Liberal 14.0
Moderate 27.9
Slightly Conservative 33.8
Highly Conservative 19.1
Party Identification
Strong Democrat 5.7
Not Very Strong Democrat 18.2
Independent 15.1
Not Very Strong Republican 35.4
Strong Republican 25.6
Recent Primary Voter
Yes 17.0
No 83.0
N 457
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Taking a look at the political characteristics that define our subjects, we find
that the pool of individuals taking part in this experiment can be classified as, for
the most part, interested in politics. Over sixty-five percent of participants described
themselves as either interested or highly interested. Only approximately twenty per-
cent fell into the categories of disinterested or highly disinterested. This political
interest, however, did not translate neatly into actually taking part in political ac-
tivities (by which I mean going out and casting a vote in a recent primary election).
Primary election participation often separates the casual political enthusiast from
the hardcore political activist, and we see some of that separation here. Only sev-
enteen percent of those surveyed cast a ballot in the primary elections held in the
months prior to the taking of the survey.
Broadly speaking, the political characteristics of those surveyed reveal a pool
that is best described as leaning toward the right of the political spectrum. Approx-
imately forty-eight percent of those responding described themselves as slightly or
highly conservative, while only just short of twenty percent felt they fell into the
slightly or highly liberal categories, leaving us with almost a 2.5 to 1 disparity in
terms of ideology. Almost twenty-eight percent of subjects described themselves as
moderate. When asked to align themselves with an actual political party name, sub-
jects appeared to be much more willing to move out of the moderate category. Just
shy of twenty-four percent of those surveyed identified themselves as strong or not
very strong democrats (an increase of nearly five percent from the liberal categories
measured by the political ideology question). On the other hand, sixty-four percent
of the subjects under examination placed themselves in the strong or not very strong
republican categories (an increase of over six percent from conservative identifiers).
The moderate (independent) category in terms of party identification is nearly cut
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in half from the political ideology category. Overall, we can conclude that the pool
is tilting toward the right and is more willing to commit to a party name than to an
ideology.
Moving away from looking at descriptive statistics, we now tackle the first
key questions formalized in Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2: does exposure to game
information increase an individual’s likelihood of responding negatively in terms of
congressional job performance? Similarly, does exposure to governing information
increase an individual’s likelihood of responding positively in terms of congressional
job performance. The answers to these questions are revealed in Table 9.
Table 9 displays the results of an ordered logit model linking media coverage
of Congress (and several other potential explanatory variables) to assessments of
congressional job performance. The results of this model clearly show that game
framing matters when it comes to individual-level responses to congressional job ap-
proval, while governing framing does not. Individuals given a news article describing
Congress in terms of conflicts and compromises were significantly less likely to ap-
prove of the job Congress is doing than those individuals in the groups that received
other types of coverage. On the other hand, there is no clear link between receiving
governing coverage and positive assessments.
Interestingly, several of the competing explanations are also linked to congres-
sional job approval. Individuals who were less interested in politics were also more
likely to rate Congress’s performance positively. Individuals who did not vote in the
most recent primary elections were also significantly more likely to rate Congress pos-
itively in terms of the job being done. There were also clear links across assessments
of different facets of Congress: individuals who rated their senators and representa-
tive highly also felt Congress was doing a good job. These results send several clear
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Table 9: Media Framing and Individual Approval of Congress
Individuals Reading
Predictors About Congress
Game Framing About Congress -1.252*
(.511)
Governing Framing About Congress -0.673
(.512)
Gender -0.160
(.268)
Race -0.322
(.232)
Political Interest 0.296*
(.165)
Political Views -0.069
(.250)
Party Identification -0.040
(.219)
Voting 0.898*
(.407)
Newspaper News Usage 0.112
(.180)
Television News Usage -0.105
(.167)
Approval of Senators 0.875*
(.313)
Approval of Representative 0.691*
(.263)
N 139
Note: This is an ordered logit model.
Higher values of congressional approval signal increased approval of Congress.
* = p < 0.05, one-tailed tests.
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signals: individuals who are disinterested and uninvolved in the political experience
seem to find positives in the legislative process, regardless of party, ideology, and
personal characteristics. Due to the nature of ordered logit models, however, coeffi-
cients are not directly interpretable in terms of effects. As such, we must separately
interpret the substantive effects of these relationships. Table 10 offers one way of
doing so.
Table 10: Substantive Effects of Predictors of Congressional Job Approval
Predictor Effect
Game Coverage -0.563
Political Interest 0.157
Voting 0.170
Senatorial Approval 0.274
Representative Approval 0.245
Note: Effects are in terms of shifts in standard deviations.
Here we see the substantive effects of variables found to be significant predic-
tors of the job approval of Congress. We can consider these effects in many ways; the
method used here considers the marginal change in y* with respect to xk. Holding
all other variables constant, we are looking at how a unit increase or a standard
deviation increase in xk shapes how many standard deviations y* increases by. We
see that for a unit increase increase in game coverage of Congress (i.e. the effect of
being subjected to game coverage of Congress), support for Congress decreases by
.56 standard deviations. Moving to the non-media related effects, we find the fol-
lowing. A standard deviation increase in political interest leads to increased support
of Congress by .16 standard deviations. A unit increase in voting (i.e. the effect of
not having voted in the most recent primary election) leads to support for Congress
declining by .40 standard deviations. Similar substantive effects exist for support of
one’s senatorial delegation, one’s representative, and one’s support of Congress. For
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a one standard deviation increase in support of one’s senators or one’s representative,
one’s support for Congress increased by .27 and .25 standard deviations respectively.
Our next question of inquiry is the potential linkage between game coverage,
governing coverage, and approval of the job one’s senatorial delegation is doing.
As Hypotheses 3 and 4 posit, I expect that exposure to game coverage will shape
an individual’s opinions of the job that his or her senatorial delegation is doing in
negative fashion, while governing coverage will have the opposite effect, driving a
positive boost in performance assessments.
Table 11 displays the results of an ordered logit model linking media coverage
of senators (and several other potential explanatory variables) to assessments of sen-
atorial job performance. Here, we find the exact opposite results as were revealed by
the earlier model linking media coverage to congressional job performance: when it
comes to approval of one’s senators, governing coverage is what matters. Individuals
given a news article describing senatorial action in terms of governing were signifi-
cantly more likely to rate their senators positively than individuals in the other two
groups. On the other hand, game coverage of senatorial actions does not seem to
shape individuals’ assessments of the jobs their senators are doing.
The competing explanations for senatorial job approval are much more minimal
than those for congressional job approval. The only clear link is between approving
of Congress and approving of one’s senators. Again, individuals who approved of one
facet of the legislative branch were significantly more likely to approve of another; in
other words, the more you approve of Congress, the more likely you are to approve of
the jobs your senators are doing. Once again, we must separately interpret the find-
ings of the model linking media coverage and senatorial approval. The substantive
impacts of the two significant predictors are displayed in Table 12.
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Table 11: Media Framing and Individual Approval of Senators
Individuals Reading
Predictors About Senators
Game Framing About Senators 0.401
(.536)
Governing Framing About Senators 0.956*
(.558)
Gender -0.087
(.351)
Race -0.157
(.318)
Political Interest -0.180
(.194)
Political Views -0.259
(.278)
Party Identification 0.364
(.262)
Voting 0.050
(.507)
Newspaper News Usage -0.225
(.177)
Television News Usage -0.010
(.176)
Approval of Congress 1.035*
(.236)
N 149
Note: This is an ordered logit model.
Higher values of congressional approval signal increased approval of Congress.
* = p < 0.05, one-tailed tests.
Table 12: Substantive Effects of Predictors of Senatorial Job Approval
Predictor Effect
Governing Coverage 0.460
Congressional Approval 0.409
Note: Effects are in terms of shifts in standard deviations.
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Here we see the effects of two variables (exposure to governing coverage about
Senators and approval of Congress) on approval of one’s senators. Similar to our
substantive analysis of approval of Congress, we will examine these findings in terms
of standard deviation movement. For a unit increase in governing coverage of a
senator (i.e. being in the treatment group exposed to such coverage), approval of
one’s senators increased by .46 standard deviations. A standard deviation increase
in approval of Congress drove a .41 standard deviation increase in approval of one’s
senators.
So, we see that game coverage has shaped assessments of Congress, while gov-
erning coverage has shaped assessments of senators. Now, we turn to assessments
of one’s member of the House of Representatives. We do so in similar fashion to
the previous two models discussed, with an ordered logit model linking individual-
level exposure to game or governing coverage to a measure of job approval of one’s
representative. This model will allow us to test Hypotheses 5 and 6, which posit sim-
ilarly to earlier hypotheses that game coverage will move opinions negatively while
governing coverage will move opinions positively.
Table 13 displays the results of the model linking media coverage of represen-
tatives (and several other potential competing explanations) to an approval measure
of the job one’s representative is doing. Here, we find that media coverage is irrele-
vant to assessments of the job performance of one’s representative. Game coverage
does not push approval downward, and governing coverage does not push approval
upward. As such, the last two hypotheses are found to be without merit. On the
other hand, some of the competing explanations are found to have significant links
to representative job approval. Political interest has a negative and significant effect
on approval of one’s representative; the more disinterested you are in politics, the
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Table 13: Media Framing and Individual Approval of Representative
Individuals Reading
Predictors About Representative
Game Framing About Congress -0.625
(.516)
Governing Framing About Congress -0.361
(.501)
Gender -0.230
(.291)
Race 0.158
(.225)
Political Interest -0.324*
(.176)
Political Views 0.555*
(.206)
Party Identification -0.242
(.189)
Voting 0.070
(.440)
Newspaper News Usage 0.080
(.157)
Television News Usage -0.164
(.160)
Approval of Congress 0.987*
(.235)
N 154
Note: This is an ordered logit model.
Higher values of congressional approval signal increased approval of Congress.
* = p < 0.05, one-tailed tests.
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more likely you are to look negatively on your representative (this contrasts with
the earlier finding of a positive benefit for Congress in the minds of those who take
little interest in politics). Political ideology also shapes one’s assessment of one’s
representative. The more conservative the individual, the more likely one was to
rate one’s representative as doing a good job in doing his or her job. Also linked
to representative approval (as it was in the senatorial model) was sentiments about
the job Congress was doing. If you liked the job performance of Congress, you were
significantly more likely to approve of the job your representative is doing. Table 14
elaborates on the substantive impact of these competing explanations found to drive
representative approval.
Table 14: Substantive Effects of Predictors of Representative Job Ap-
proval
Predictor Effect
Political Interest -0.146
Political Ideology 0.304
Congressional Approval 0.370
Note: Effects are in terms of shifts in standard deviations.
As with the previous two models, when discussing substantive impacts we will
do so in terms of shifts of standard deviations. Interest in politics (in this case, a one
standard deviation increase in interest) is linked to a .14 standard deviation drop in
approval of one’s representative. Ideology, as was just discussed, also plays a role
in shaping approval of representatives; with every standard deviation movement in
a conservative direction, approval of one’s representative increases by .30 standard
deviations. Finally, once again, there is a tight link between approving of the branch
and approving of the individuals; a one standard deviation increase in approval of
Congress drives a .37 standard deviation increase in approval of one’s representative.
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Implications
Just as we saw at the macro level, game and governing coverage have the
power to shape opinions of individual legislators and of Congress at the micro level.
However, at the micro level, the picture is not as straightforward. Game coverage
is a significant predictor of approval solely at the level of Congress. This might
be because game coverage of Congress only further hammers home the widely-held
sentiment that Congress is an institution burdened by gridlock. Governing coverage
is a significant predictor of approval solely at the level of one’s senatorial delegation.
This might be because governing coverage of senators reinforces the lessons we are
taught about the individuals we send to Washington, namely that they are working
for us in the face of the gridlock caused by other legislators. Unfortunately, however,
this concept and explanation is not reinforced by the model examining approval
of representatives. Nor is the idea that because representatives receive less media
attention than do senators, individuals will be more easily swayed by new information
pushing a game or governing perspective on legislative activities.
Given the findings here, we can also make broader claims about how this
research fits into the pattern of research a handful of scholars have already performed
in this topic. Like most scholars, we find no link between demographics and approval
at any level of examination. Like most scholars, where we do find strong linkages
is between approval of one portion of the legislative branch and approval of other
portions; approval of Congress is linked to approval of specific legislators and vice
versa.
In sum, we see that at another level of analysis, the type of media coverage
individuals are exposed to can play a role in their assessments of legislators and the
legislative branch. Media coverage targeted in this fashion may not shape opinion
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in each and every way predicted, but it still has the potential to shape attitudes
in positive and negative ways depending on the inclusion of governing and game
elements.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Try as they might to control information flows about what work is being done
and how work is being done, Congress and its members must rely on the media to
spread messages about what work is being done, what issues are being addressed,
and what outputs are being produced. Often times, the message the media does
spread is a mix of these aforementioned messages along with a discussion of how
individuals, leaders, parties, and chambers went about their work (and often times,
the problems that ensue). As this project has shown, this has implications for how
legislators and the legislative branch go about their business and, eventually, how
they are perceived by the general public. These specific implications will now be
discussed.
Chapter III showed that over a thirty year period between 1977 and 2006, both
game and governing framing significantly affected approval of congress. The findings
were in the direction predicted by the hypotheses, namely that game framing would
drive congressional approval downward while governing framing would drive congres-
sional approval upward. The chapter validates the idea that what the mass media
report has the power to shape evaluations. Additionally, the chapter verifies the work
of previous congressional approval models that show the power of economic expec-
tations and presidential approval in affecting how American approve or disapprove
of the legislative branch.
Chapter IV showed that game and governing framing significantly affected
senatorial approval during an eleven month period in 2006 (the second half of the
109th Congress), but in different ways. Levels of game framing separated senators
with low approval from senators with high approval. On the other hand, levels of
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governing framing were linked to positive movement in senatorial approval from one
month to the next. These findings show the situational power of game and governing
framing when it comes to the opinion-based fates of legislators.
Chapter V showed the power of game and governing framing at the individual
level. An original survey experiment showed that reading a heavily game framed
story about Congress significantly drove opinions of Congress downward. It also
showed that reading a heavily governing framed story about a senator significantly
drove opinions of one’s senatorial delegation upward. These findings revealed that
game and governing have effects not just at the macro level and not just over time,
but also at the micro level.
The findings in total here also speak broadly to the debate over the power of the
media in shaping opinion. As Clawson and Oxley (2008) discuss, general sentiment
about media effects seems to be that media does not have a hypodermic effect or a
minimal effect, but rather a subtle effect that is in many ways situational. Among
these subtle effects are the power of the media when it comes to agenda setting,
priming, and framing. Generally, the findings here support the idea that media
framing is real and powerful. More specifically, the findings throughout this project
lend credence to the idea that there are distinct ways in which the media define their
discussions of legislators and the legislative branch and that these definitions drive
the ways in which Americans assess Congress and its members.
Revisiting Fenno’s Paradox
More importantly for our earlier discussion of where assessments of Congress
and its members come from, we can argue that game and governing framing add
another piece to the puzzle of solving the paradox laid out by Fenno (1975) over
thirty years ago. As Chapter II points out, Fenno was concerned with discovering
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why Americans seem to dislike Congress but like the members of Congress they
send to Washington. Fenno chalked this up to what he called different standards of
judgement, and since then scholars have attempted in piecemeal fashion to determine
what those standards of judgement might be.
I argue that levels of game and governing coverage are part of the judgement
matrix that Americans bring to the table when asked to evaluate their representa-
tion. As Chapter III shows, game coverage helps suppress approval, while governing
coverage lifts up approval. Levels of governing coverage may be higher in the av-
erage quarter than levels of game coverage, but as Table 2 reveals, the impact of
game coverage is nearly four times as high as governing coverage. Game coverage is
clearly keeping Congress mired in the disfavor to which Fenno alludes. When gov-
erning coverage increases though, Congress can benefit. Unfortunately for Congress,
as discussed earlier, is the fact that no one is looking out for the institution. No one,
outside of leaders in the majority party perhaps, can work to ensure that Congress
works more efficiently and deals with more issues than it has in the past, and even
those leaders have their own futures to worry about.
Additionally, we can see how game and governing matter when it comes to the
legislators we love (and the small few we do not love). Game coverage helps explain
the outliers in Fenno’s argument, the ones that are unloved (or, at least, are unloved
by a larger number of constituents than the norm). Those who receive higher levels
of game coverage, i.e. those who are tied to discussions of squabbling and gridlock,
are those who are the exception to Fenno’s rule. They suffer in the eyes of those
citizens that sent them to Washington. It is the governing coverage that we often
associate with legislators (the self-serving discussion of legislators working on issues
and producing outputs for their states or districts, in essence the media-based crux
130
of Mayhew’s (1974) prescription for legislators to advertise, take positions, and claim
credit) that separates the upwardly mobile in terms of opinion from those who are
not improving in the eyes of the public. Game and governing frames are linked with a
state’s ability to assess which senators are performing well, which are not performing
well, and which are deserving of better or worse approval than in the past.
Media framing may not be a silver bullet when it comes to answering the many,
many questions that Fenno asked, but it definitely plays a role in explaining both
opinions about Congress and opinions about individual legislators. Moreover, as has
been discussed throughout this project, media framing may prove a more logical
response to Fenno’s questions than most responses based on the outputs of Congress
and its members, given American reliance on media for information and lack of direct
access to politics and politicians.
Future Research
The findings here naturally lead to applications in other subfields when it
comes to the link between media framing and opinion. Patterson (1993) showed
the viability of game and governing framing in a campaign context, and here we
show the viability of these frames in a congressional context. Might these frames
also exist in an executive or judicial context? Might they shape approval in both of
those contexts? Such possibilities are worth examining. We might also want to ask
ourselves what other frames besides game and governing might exist in any of these
contexts. Some existing research does exist along these lines (Durr, Gilmour, and
Wolbrecht (1997) for example has inquired into positivity and negativity, while others
(Patterson and Caldeira 1990) have looked specifically at scandal coverage), but
continued examination of the ways in which media members tell stories is necessary,
not only because we should want to know what shapes approval, but also because
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we should want to monitor the dynamics behind the ways in which the media work,
allowing us to assess how well the media carries out its reporting and watchdog
functions.
Given the constant changes in the business of media, tracking the prevalence
of frames over time is also worthy of inquiry. As Patterson (2000)? has shown,
competition in media has lead to a shift away from covering leaders and issues and
toward stories without a policy angle. What implications might this have for the
game and governing frame? Should we expect to see these frames decline over time
(especially the governing frame)? With newspapers at risk of disappearing in some
places or reconfiguring their purpose and scope in others and with television outlets
trimming their budgets (and as such, their ability to do original news-gathering),
what will potential declines in information quality mean for the ability of Americans
to credibly assess Congress itself as well as those who represent them in the House
and Senate?
Regardless of an ever-changing media environment, one thing has not seemed
to change over time: the fact that the mass media are and will continue to be, as
Clawson and Oxley (2008, p.61) put it, “an intermediary between citizens and elites,
providing both with the information essential for a well-functioning democracy.” This
role has definite rewards for society, in that it saves time and energy for Americans
when it comes to efforts to gather information about the political world around them.
It helps minimize the difference between the costs of learning about politics and the
potential benefits of being an active, engaged citizen. This only works, however, so
long as we can be confident in the material the media produce. If the media have to
report about Congress and its members in a fashion whereby they pick and choose
what is newsworthy and what is not, we must hope that this picking and choosing is
132
done in a way that assists the public and not in a way that only assists the media in
making their job easier or in moving their financial bottom line from the red to the
black. We must hope that the media, in serving as a watchdog, is not in constant
need of being watched themselves.
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APPENDIX A
The following is a list of root words utilized in the search for game coverage of
Congress:
impede, cease, stop, block, obstruct, prevent, halt, bicker, disagree, feud, quar-
rel, assail, attack, criticize, poll, battle, win, lose, impugn, protest, retaliate, combat,
skirmish, process, election, fundraising, divide, split, shutdown, partisan, leader,
agree, leadership, advance, guide, pilot, spark, start, direct, drive, persuade, usher,
affect, command, contribute, induce, manage, prompt, move, spur, influence, sway,
debate, agree, consensus, unity, unite, champion, agree, unanimous, unison, pact,
bipartisan, negotiate, filibuster, cloture
The following is a list of words utilized in the search for governing coverage of
Congress:
hold, vote, joint committee, joint session, joint resolution, lame duck, lobby,
marking, nomination, special session, sponsor, standing committee, subcommittee,
motion, budget, chairman, agriculture, environment, health, crime, drug, welfare,
tax, death penalty, capital punishment, child care, civil rights, gun, busing, affir-
mative action, war, job, inflation, economy, abortion, education, unemployment,
terrorism, military, medicare, medicaid, school, AIDS, unions, birth control, busi-
ness, labor, urban, city, cities, natural resources, endangered species, budget, free
speech, internet, gay rights, immigration, veterans, social security, poverty, peace,
technology, infrastructure, security, reform, energy, free trade
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APPENDIX B
The following are the questions utilized in Chapter III for the composition of
the dependent variable capturing approval of Congress from 1977-2006.
ABC News/Washington Post N=9 Do you approve or disapprove of the way
Congress is doing its job?
ANES N=4 In general, do you approve or disapprove of the way the U.S.
(United States) Congress has been handling its job?
CBS N=36 Do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress is handling its
job?
CBS/New York Times N=59 Do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress
is handling its job?
Fox News/Opinion Dynamics N=17 Do you approve or disapprove of the job
Congress is doing?
Gallup N=46 Do you approve or disapprove of the way the U.S. Congress is
handling its job?
Gallup/CNN/USA Today N=28 Do you approve or disapprove of the way
Congress is handling its job?
NBC/Wall Street Journal N=57 In general, do you approve or disapprove of
the job Congress is doing?
Time/CNN N=14 In general, do you approve or disapprove of the job that the
U.S. (United States) Congress is doing?
Washington Post N=48 Do you approve or disapprove of the way the US
(United States) Congress is doing its job?
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APPENDIX C
The following newspapers were used in Chapter IV in examining media cover-
age of senators throughout calendar year 2006.
Alabama: Birmingham News
Alaska: Anchorage Daily News
Arkansas: Arkansas Democrat Gazette
California: San Francisco Chronicle
Colorado: Denver Post
Connecticut: Connecticut Post
Florida: St. Petersburg Times
Georgia: Atlanta Journal Constitution
Idaho: Lewiston Morning Tribune
Illinois: Chicago Sun Times
Indiana: South Bend Tribune
Iowa: Dubuque Telegraph Herald
Kansas: Topeka Capital Journal
Louisiana: New Orleans Times-Picayune
Maine: Portland Press-Herald
Maryland: The Capital
Massachusetts: Boston Globe
Michigan: Grand Rapids Press
Minnesota: St. Paul Pioneer Press
Missouri: St. Louis Post-Dispatch
Nebraska: Omaha World-Herald
Nevada: Las Vegas Review-Journal
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New Hampshire: Manchester Union Leader
New Jersey: Newark Star-Ledger
New Mexico: Albuquerque Journal
New York: New York Times
North Carolina: Raleigh News and Observer
North Dakota: Bismarck Tribune
Ohio: Columbus Dispatch
Oklahoma: Tulsa World
Oregon: Portland Oregonian
Pennsylvania: Philadelphia Inquirer
Rhode Island: Providence Journal
South Carolina: Charleston Post and Courier
Tennessee: Chattanooga Times Free Press
Texas: Houston Chronicle
Utah: Salt Lake City Tribune
Vermont: Brattleboro Reformer
Virginia: Virginian-Pilot
Washington: Seattle Post Intelligencer
West Virginia: Charleston Gazette-Mail
Wisconsin: Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel
Wyoming: Wyoming Tribune Eagle
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APPENDIX D
The following are the media stories given to individuals participating in the
experiment discussed in Chapter V.
Treatment One: Story about Congress using Game Framing
Congress Closes Session With Economic Bill; Both Sides Continue
To Quarrel
Attempting to prevent a potential recession predicted by analysts, the 110th
session of Congress recessed today with the House and Senate passing legislation
aimed at halting an economic slowdown and spurring job growth. Both chambers
also passed preventative legislation aimed at rolling back increasing gasoline prices
amidst discussion of how to balance business and environmental factors.
On the heels of a 2007 session filled with disagreements, obstruction, and at-
tempts to impede the legislative process, Congress opened its latest session with high
hopes for ending partisan bickering but few members stepping forward and showing
a willingness to champion efforts for bipartisan unity and consensus.
Upon their return, House members are scheduled to begin debate on several
measures halted in late March thanks to quarreling over stark divisions between key
members. Leaders hope these talks will spur negotiations between feuding members
of the opposing parties, but senior legislative aides said Monday that such hopes
might prove to be fruitless ones.
“We’re moving to fix this,” a House aide said to reporters, “but we can’t per-
suade members to talk when they’re so focused on retaliating against opponents
and attacking their fellow members of Congress.” Another aide, speaking confiden-
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tially to reporters, pointed out several skirmishes that could have been avoided but
threatened to flare up in the upcoming days and weeks.
Members of the Senate plan on returning to Washington with similar desires
to find consensus on measures slowed by the threat of filibuster last fall, but face
similar battles as their House counterparts.
“Divisions are threatening to shutdown all efforts to advance our body’s agenda,”
claimed key Senate leaders asked about the obstructions of the past few months.
“There may be very few winners this spring,” the leaders went on to state.
Treatment Two: Story about Congress using Governing Framing
Congress Closes Session With Economic Bill; Both Sides Debate,
Work To Schedule Votes
Attempting to prevent a potential recession predicted by analysts, the 110th
session of Congress recessed today with the House and Senate passing legislation
aimed at halting an economic slowdown and spurring job growth. Both chambers
also passed preventative legislation aimed at rolling back increasing gasoline prices
amidst discussion of how to balance business and environmental factors.
On the heels of a 2007 session filled with key votes on important issues like
energy policy, crime, and welfare and impending committee decisions concerning
legislation on health care, terrorism, and civil rights, Congress closed its latest session
Tuesday with plans to continue tackling issues on the minds of Americans.
House members are scheduled in the upcoming weeks to begin voting on several
measures that passed through committee in late December before representatives left
for their holiday break. Leaders hope to quickly address bills dealing with environ-
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mental concerns and immigration, but senior legislative aides said Monday that such
votes might not be taken until after the House deals with bills addressing tax breaks
and the federal budget.
“We’re moving to schedule as many votes as we can,” a House aide said to
reporters asking about House progress on key issues, “and we expect several com-
mittees and subcommittees to provide more action in the upcoming days and weeks
that will require further motions to address.” Another aide, speaking confidentially
to reporters, pointed out that he expects legislative sponsors to aggressively address
new issues in the upcoming weeks, such as military funding, infrastructure, and free
trade.
Members of the Senate will return to Washington in two weeks with similar
desires to move legislation through committee and schedule votes in the near future.
Similar to their House counterparts, Senators expect to discuss the war in great
detail, without forgetting legislation dealing with inflation and funding education.
Senators also expect to vote on several federal-level nominations over the next few
months.
“We have a broad agenda to tackle in the near future, from discussing the
budget to ensuring that military issues like caring for veterans and preventing ter-
rorism are answered,” claimed key Senate leaders asked about bills handled over the
past few months. “We will be handling many issues this spring that need to be
addressed,” the leaders went on to state.
Treatment Three: Story about Senator using Game Framing
Senator Closes Session With Economic Bill; Both Sides Continue To
Quarrel
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Attempting to help prevent a potential recession predicted by analysts, the
110th session of Congress recessed today with the Senator helping pass legislation
aimed at halting an economic slowdown and spurring job growth. He also played
a role in passing preventative legislation aimed at rolling back increasing gasoline
prices amidst discussion of how to balance business and environmental factors.
On the heels of a 2007 session filled with disagreements, obstruction, and at-
tempts to impede the legislative process, the Senator planned to return for the latest
session in a few weeks with high hopes for ending partisan bickering in which he
was involved, but finds few of his fellow members stepping forward and showing a
willingness to champion efforts for bipartisan unity and consensus.
The Senator is scheduled to participate in debates on several measures halted
in late December thanks to quarreling over stark divisions between key members. He
hopes these talks will spur negotiations between feuding members of the opposing
parties, but he also stated Monday that such hopes might prove to be fruitless ones.
“We’re moving to fix this,” the Senator said to reporters, “but we can’t per-
suade members to talk when we’re so focused on retaliating against opponents and
attacking their fellow members of Congress.” An aide, speaking confidentially to re-
porters, pointed out several skirmishes that the Senator was embroiled in that could
have been avoided and have threatened to flare up once again in the upcoming weeks
and months.
Fellow Senators will return to Washington with similar desires to find consensus
on measures slowed by the threat of filibuster last fall.
“Divisions are threatening to shutdown all efforts to advance our body’s agenda,”
claimed key Senate leaders asked about the obstructions of the past few months.
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“There may be very few winners this spring,” the Senator went on to state.
Treatment Four: Story about Senator using Governing Framing
Senator Closes Session With Economic Bill; Both Sides Debate,
Work To Schedule Votes
Attempting to help prevent a potential recession predicted by analysts, the
110th session of Congress recessed today with the Senator helping pass legislation
aimed at halting an economic slowdown and spurring job growth. He also played
a role in passing preventative legislation aimed at rolling back increasing gasoline
prices amidst discussion of how to balance business and environmental factors.
On the heels of a 2007 session in which he participated in key votes on impor-
tant issues like energy policy, crime, and welfare and impending committee decisions
concerning legislation on health care, terrorism, and civil rights, the Senator will
return to Washington in a few weeks with plans to tackle issues on the minds of
constituents.
The Senator is scheduled to begin voting on several measures that passed
through committee in late December before the Senate left for their holiday break. He
hopes to quickly address bills dealing with environmental concerns and immigration,
but his legislative aides said Monday that such votes might not be taken until after
the Senate deals with bills addressing tax breaks and the federal budget.
“We’re moving to schedule as many votes as we can,” the Senator said to re-
porters asking about Senate progress on key issues, “and we expect several commit-
tees and subcommittees to provide more action in the upcoming days and weeks that
will require further motions to address.” Another of the Senator’s aides, speaking
confidentially to reporters, pointed out that he expects the Senator to aggressively
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address new issues in the upcoming weeks, such as military funding, infrastructure,
and free trade.
Fellow members of the Senate will return to Washington with similar desires to
move legislation through committee and schedule votes in the near future. Similar
to his House counterparts, the Senator expects to discuss the war in great detail,
without forgetting legislation dealing with inflation and funding education. He also
expects to vote on several federal-level nominations over the next few months.
“We have a broad agenda to tackle in the near future, from discussing the bud-
get to ensuring that military issues like caring for veterans and preventing terrorism
are answered,” claimed the Senator when asked about bills handled over the past few
months. “We will be handling many issues this spring that need to be addressed,”
he went on to state.
Treatment Five: Story about Representative using Game Framing
Representative Closes Session With Economic Bill; Both Sides Con-
tinue To Quarrel
Attempting to help prevent a potential recession predicted by analysts, the
110th session of Congress recessed today with the Representative helping pass leg-
islation aimed at halting an economic slowdown and spurring job growth. He also
played a role in passing preventative legislation aimed at rolling back increasing gaso-
line prices amidst discussion of how to balance business and environmental factors.
On the heels of a 2007 session filled with disagreements, obstruction, and at-
tempts to impede the legislative process, the Representative planned to return for
the latest session in a few weeks with high hopes for ending partisan bickering in
which he was involved, but finds few of his fellow members stepping forward and
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showing a willingness to champion efforts for bipartisan unity and consensus.
The Representative is scheduled to participate in debates on several measures
halted in late December thanks to quarreling over stark divisions between key mem-
bers. Hopes are high that these talks will spur negotiations between feuding members
of the opposing parties, but he also stated Monday that such hopes might prove to
be fruitless ones.
“We’re moving to fix this,” the Representative said to reporters, “but we can’t
persuade members to talk when we’re so focused on retaliating against opponents
and attacking their fellow members of Congress.” An aide, speaking confidentially
to reporters, pointed out several skirmishes that the Representative was embroiled
in that could have been avoided and have threatened to flare up once again in the
upcoming weeks and months.
Fellow House members will return to Washington with similar desires to find
consensus on measures slowed by the threat of filibuster last fall.
“Divisions are threatening to shutdown all efforts to advance our body’s agenda,”
claimed key House leaders asked about the obstructions of the past few months.
“There may be very few winners this spring,” the Representative went on to state.
Treatment Six: Story about Representative using Governing Framing
Representative Closes Session With Economic Bill; Both Sides De-
bate, Work To Schedule Votes
Attempting to help prevent a potential recession predicted by analysts, the
110th session of Congress recessed today with the Representative helping pass leg-
islation aimed at halting an economic slowdown and spurring job growth. He also
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played a role in passing preventative legislation aimed at rolling back increasing gaso-
line prices amidst discussion of how to balance business and environmental factors.
On the heels of a 2007 session in which there was participation in key votes
on important issues like energy policy, crime, and welfare and impending committee
decisions concerning legislation on health care, terrorism, and civil rights, the Rep-
resentative will return to Washington in a few weeks with plans to tackle issues on
the minds of constituents.
The Representative is scheduled to begin voting on several measures that
passed through committee in late December before the House left for their holiday
break. The Representative hopes to quickly address bills dealing with environmen-
tal concerns and immigration, but his legislative aides said Monday that such votes
might not be taken until after the House deals with bills addressing tax breaks and
the federal budget
“We’re moving to schedule as many votes as we can,” the Representative said
to reporters asking about House progress on key issues, “and we expect several
committees and subcommittees to provide more action in the upcoming weeks that
will require further motions to address.” Another of the Representative’s aides,
speaking confidentially to reporters, pointed out that he expects the Representative
to aggressively address new issues in the upcoming weeks, such as military funding,
infrastructure, and free trade.
Fellow members of the House will return to Washington with similar desires to
move legislation through committee and schedule votes in the near future. Similar
to his Senate counterparts, the Representative expects to discuss the war in great
detail, without forgetting legislation dealing with inflation and funding education.
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“We have a broad agenda to tackle in the near future, from discussing the
budget to ensuring that military issues like caring for veterans and preventing ter-
rorism are answered,” claimed the Representative when asked about bills handled
over the past few months. “We will be handling many issues this spring that need
to be addressed,” he went on to state.
Treatment Seven: Control Story about Congress
Congress Closes Session With Economic Bill
Attempting to prevent a potential recession predicted by analysts, the 110th
session of Congress recessed today with the House and Senate passing legislation
aimed at halting an economic slowdown and spurring job growth. Both chambers
also passed preventative legislation aimed at rolling back increasing gasoline prices
amidst discussion of how to balance business and environmental factors.
Treatment Eight: Control Story about Senator
Senator Closes Session With Economic Bill
Attempting to help prevent a potential recession predicted by analysts, the
110th session of Congress recessed today with the Senator helping pass legislation
aimed at halting an economic slowdown and spurring job growth. He also played
a role in passing preventative legislation aimed at rolling back increasing gasoline
prices amidst discussion of how to balance business and environmental factors.
Treatment Nine: Control Story about Representative
Representative Closes Session With Economic Bill
Attempting to help prevent a potential recession predicted by analysts, the
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110th session of Congress recessed today with the Representative helping pass leg-
islation aimed at halting an economic slowdown and spurring job growth. He also
played a role in passing preventative legislation aimed at rolling back increasing gaso-
line prices amidst discussion of how to balance business and environmental factors.
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APPENDIX E
The following questions were asked to all individuals taking part in the survey
experiment discussed in Chapter V. Questions one through nine were answered be-
fore reading a treatment, while questions ten through eighteen were answered after
reading a treatment.
1. Please fill in (Code Denoting Treatment Number) for Question One.
2. What is your gender? A) Female B) Male
3. What racial group do you consider yourself to be a part of? A) African
American B) Asian American C) Caucasian D) Latino E) Other
4. How interested would you say that you are in politics? A) Highly Interested
B) Interested C) Unsure D) Disinterested E) Highly Disinterested
5. On a scale from highly liberal to highly conservative, how would you char-
acterize your political beliefs? A) Highly liberal B) Slightly liberal C) Moderate D)
Slightly conservative E) Highly conservative
6. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, Repub-
lican, Independent, or what? A) Strong Democrat B) Not Very Strong Democrat C)
Independent D) Not Very Strong Republican E) Strong Republican
7. Did you vote in the primary elections held in March? A) Yes B) No C)
Unsure
8. On average, how often do you read the news section of a newspaper? A)
zero days a week B) one to two days a week C) three to four days a week D) five to
six days a week E) every day
9. On average, how many days a week do you watch news coverage on televi-
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sion? A) zero days a week B) one to two days a week C) three to four days a week
D) five to six days a week E) every day
10. Do you approve or disapprove of the job Congress is doing? A) Strongly
Approve B) Approve C) No Opinion/Not Sure D) Disapprove E) Strongly Disapprove
11. As you know, our federal government is made up of three branches: an Ex-
ecutive branch, headed by the President, a Judicial branch, headed by the Supreme
Court, and a Legislative branch, made up of the Senate and House of Represen-
tatives. Let me ask you how much trust you have at this time in the Legislative
branch, consisting of the US Senate and House of Representatives–a great deal, a
fair amount, not very much, or none at all? A) A Great Deal B) A Fair Amount C)
No Opinion/Not Sure D) Not Very Much E) None At All
12. Please tell me how much confidence you have in Congress: A) A Great
Deal B) A Fair Amount C) No Opinion/Not Sure D) Only A Little E) Almost None
13. Do you approve or disapprove of the job your U.S. Senators are doing? A)
Strongly Approve B) Approve C) No Opinion/Not Sure D) Disapprove E) Strongly
Disapprove
14. Let me ask you how much trust you have at this time in your U.S. Senators:
a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all? A) A Great Deal B) A
Fair Amount C) No Opinion/Not Sure D) Not Very Much E) None At All
15. Please tell me how much confidence you have in your U.S. Senators: A) A
Great Deal B) A Fair Amount C) No Opinion/Not Sure D) Only A Little E) Almost
None
16. Do you approve or disapprove of the job your U.S. Representative is do-
ing? A) Strongly Approve B) Approve C) No Opinion/Not Sure D) Disapprove E)
154
Strongly Disapprove
17. Let me ask you how much trust you have at this time in your U.S. Rep-
resentative: a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all? A) A Great
Deal B) A Fair Amount C) No Opinion/Not Sure D) Not Very Much E) None At
All
18. Please tell me how much confidence you have in your U.S. Representative:
A) A Great Deal B) A Fair Amount C) No Opinion/Not Sure D) Only A Little E)
Almost None
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